

**Follow-up on the TriData Report's
Recommendations for Emergency Preparedness**

December 12, 2006

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The Honorable Greg Nickels
Seattle City Councilmembers
City of Seattle
Seattle, Washington 98104

Dear Mayor Nickels and City Councilmembers:

Attached is our report *Follow-up on the TriData Report's Recommendations for Emergency Preparedness*. The review's primary objective was to determine the implementation status of the 111 recommendations concerning Seattle's emergency preparedness program made by the TriData consulting firm in a September 2003 report. We concluded that about 75 percent of TriData's recommendations have been successfully addressed by the City, while the remaining recommendations have yet to be fully addressed.

We obtained comments on drafts of our report from the City departments mentioned in TriData's recommendations.

We appreciate the cooperation provided by the departments during our review, and we wish to extend particular thanks to Barb Graff, Director of Emergency Management, for the time she spent on this project.

Assistant City Auditor Jane Dunkel and Deputy City Auditor David G. Jones were the auditors assigned to this project.

Sincerely,

Susan Cohen

Susan Cohen
City Auditor

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Project Overview

Last year, after the Executive provided information to the City Council regarding the City's progress in implementing the 2003 TriData report on the City's emergency preparedness, several Councilmembers requested that my office obtain, verify and summarize more specific information on the Executive's progress in implementing those recommendations. The TriData report examined the City's emergency management program, and included 111 recommendations for improving the City's emergency preparedness, response, and recovery plans.¹ As seen in Table 1, based on our review², we believe the City has successfully addressed 83 of the recommendations. We consider those recommendations closed and will not conduct further follow up work on them. We believe the City has not fully addressed 28 of the recommendations and will include them in our follow up data base for further review next year. The City's Director of Emergency Management reviewed this report and did not provide any formal comments.

Table I. Status of 111 TriData Recommendations - December 2006

Category	Number of recommendations
Closed recommendations	
Implemented ³	60
In process, no barriers to completion	6
No longer applicable	1
Executive or City Council disagree with rec.	16
Subtotal closed recommendations:	83
Open recommendations	
In process	21
Policy or budget decision	7
Subtotal open recommendations:	28
TOTAL - All Recommendations:	111

Appendices IV through VI contain detailed information on each recommendation along with supporting data that explains our basis for how we categorized each recommendation. This report also provides information on key departments' current emergency preparedness priorities (see Appendix VII) and describes two of the criteria available to the City for assessing the effectiveness of their emergency preparedness program (see Appendix VIII).

¹ Appendix I shows the issues areas for each of the 111 TriData recommendations.

² Appendix II describes the objectives, scope and methodology of our work.

³ Some recommendations were complex and had more than one part. For those recommendations, if one part was implemented but the other was not, we divided the recommendation into two categories and assigned .5 to each category. Numbers in this table are rounded.

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Appendix I TriData Report Recommendations by Issue Area

TriData grouped its recommendations for improving the City's emergency preparedness into the following categories:

1. Overview of Emergency Preparedness (2 recommendations)
2. Assessment of Hazards, Risks, and Vulnerabilities (14 recommendations)
3. Analysis of Emergency Management Functions
 - Emergency Operations Center (9 recommendations)
 - Security and Protection of Seattle (9 recommendations)
 - Police Operations (11 recommendations)
 - Fire Operations (1 recommendation)
 - Special Operations (10 recommendations)
 - Public Utilities (11 recommendations)
 - Emergency Public Information (5 recommendations)
 - Communications, and Information Technology: Operation, Functionality, and Interoperability (14 recommendations)
 - Public Health (12 recommendations)
4. Continuity of Government (11 recommendations)
5. Alternative Funding Opportunities (2 recommendations)

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Appendix II Objectives, Scope and Methodology

At the request of Seattle City Councilmembers Nick Licata and Richard Conlin, we conducted audit work to determine the status of each recommendation contained in the 2003 TriData report. To do this, we interviewed City managers, reviewed City policies, procedures, planning documents and agreements, and conducted site visits. We also interviewed numerous outside experts, including, among others, personnel from the State of Washington's Emergency Management Division, the Washington State National Guard, King County's Office of Emergency Management, Public Health Seattle King County, the University of Washington's Seismology Laboratory, and the Building Owners and Managers Association of Seattle (for a comprehensive list, see Appendix VI).

For the purposes of our analysis, we categorized a recommendation as **closed** if it: a) had been implemented, b) is in the process of being implemented and we see no barriers to its implementation, c) is no longer applicable, or d) the Executive or City Council disagreed with and does not intend to implement the recommendation and we agreed with their decision. We categorized a recommendation as **open – in process** if implementation of the recommendation was not complete and additional monitoring to ensure its completion was warranted. We categorized a recommendation as **open – policy decision** if additional funding or City Council action was needed to implement it.

We conducted our work between July and October 2006, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. In performing audits, our office follows the Government Audit Standards, as prescribed by the Comptroller General of the United States, and the Institute of Internal Auditors' (IIA) International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing. With respect to quality assurance reviews and training, the Seattle Office of City Auditor follows the IIA standards.

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Appendix III

Status of TriData Recommendations by Category

Table II. Status of Individual TriData Recommendations – December 2006

Category	Number of recommendations	Recommendation	
Closed Recommendations			
Implemented ⁴	60	2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 12, (.5) 13, (.5) 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 32, 35, 36, 38, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 48, 49, 51, 52, 53, 55, 56, 57, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 74, 78, 79, 80, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 96, 97, 102, 103, 108, 110, 111	
In process, no barriers to completion	6	7, 23, 46, 54, 58, 64	
No longer applicable	1	33	
Executive or City Council disagree with the recommendation	16	1, 9, (.5) 13, (.5) 14, 26, 29, 30, 31, 37, 50, 77, 82, 100, 101, 104, 105, 106	
Subtotal Closed Recommendations:	83		
Open Recommendations			
In process	21	3, 11, 17, 27, 28, 34, 47, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 72, 73, 76, 81, 90, 94, 95, 99, 107	
Policy or budget decision	7	39, 75, 91, 92, 93, 98, 109	
Subtotal Open Recommendations:	28		
TOTAL - All Recommendations:	111		

⁴ Some recommendations were complex and had more than one part. For those recommendations, if one part was implemented but the other was not, we divided the recommendation into two categories and assigned .5 to each category. Numbers in this table are rounded.

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Appendix IV Closed Recommendations

TriData Recommendation #1	<p>The Emergency Management Bureau should be moved out of the Police Department and under the Mayor, directly. Many cities are moving in this direction.</p>
Status: CLOSED	<p>To date, the Executive has not implemented this recommendation. However, the Mayor continually evaluates the appropriate organizational location of the Office of Emergency Management, as indicated by the Office's realignment within the Police Department. In addition, the Mayor meets directly with the Director of Emergency Management on a regular basis.</p>
12/5/05 Executive Response	<p>The success of the City's emergency management program is not dependent on the organization in which it is housed, but rather upon the support provided by the Mayor, the Council, and all City Departments.</p>

Additional Information Collected by the Office of City Auditor	<p>Seattle Police Department (SPD) response: Although some cities and communities may have emergency preparedness as part of the Mayoral structure it is not clear that that is the norm. In particular, after 9/11 locales such as Fairfax County, Virginia and others have emergency preparedness as a part of the law enforcement agency. As we have seen with the issue at the federal level of determining where FEMA should be housed (cabinet level, part of the Department of Homeland Security, other), the critical element is whether the appropriate personnel (expertise, knowledge, experience in emergency preparedness) are put in charge and whether emergency preparedness receives support and direction from the Mayor and key city departments. It is clear that in our present structure, it does.</p>
	<p>In July 2006, the Office of Emergency Management (OEM) was moved from SPD's Emergency Preparedness Bureau to the Chief of Police Office. The change in the chain of command is that the Director of OEM now reports to the Police Chief and meets on a monthly basis with the Mayor.</p>

<p>TriData Recommendation #2</p> <p>Status: CLOSED</p> <p>12/5/05 Executive Response</p>	<p>Seattle should continue to seek representation in positions of authority on local and State committees that control direct planning and reviewing of operations. The City must take an active role in leadership to ensure, if an emergency occurs, that they are not only receiving mutual aid but also have an influential voice for any regional response efforts.</p> <p>The recommendation has been implemented. See below for details.</p> <p>Staff from various departments serve on local, state and federal committees and technical advisory panels that shape policies and plans. For instance, the Director of Emergency Management chairs the King County Emergency Advisory Committee/Region 6 Homeland Security Council.</p> <p>SPD response: Seattle participates in all avenues of regional cooperation available. For instance, Seattle maintains its own local emergency management program. Seattle is the core member of the Urban Area Security Initiative (the others include Bellevue, King County, Snohomish County, Pierce County, and the State of Washington). Seattle is an active participant in the State's regional structure for Homeland Security, serving on the Region 6 (county-wide) Homeland Security Subcommittee and Emergency Management Advisory Committee/Region 6 Homeland Security Council.</p> <p>King County response: The City of Seattle is involved in all the emergency preparedness efforts, committees and subcommittees in our region. King County has been working closely with the City of Seattle for the last fourteen months. Barb Graff, the City of Seattle's Emergency Management Director, chairs the region's Emergency Management Advisory Committee. This committee serves three purposes: 1) regional emergency management, 2) as the Region 6 Homeland Security Council, and 3) as the Region 6 Citizen Corps Council. The City of Seattle is also on the Regional Homeland Security Subcommittee of Region 6 Council. In addition, the City of Seattle has representation on all the regional emergency preparedness subcommittees, a full list of which can be found at www.metrokc.gov/prepare/homelandsecurity.</p> <p>Washington State response: Seattle is the primary Urban Cities' representative on the Washington State Committee on Homeland Security (CHS). Spokane serves as the alternate member. The CHS is a Standing Committee of the State's Emergency Management Council (EMC), and, on behalf of the EMC, vets issues related to the measures taken using federal Homeland Security funds. EMC's membership is statutorily mandated and includes representatives of state associations (such as the Cities and Counties of the State), private industry, and professional associations related to public safety.</p>
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Allocating Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) funds: All potential funding decisions are first reviewed by the state's nine homeland security regions. If approved, they are then reviewed by the Committee on Homeland Security, and its subcommittee on equipment if necessary. Next, they are reviewed by the State's Emergency Management Committee (EMC). At each step, there is free and open discussion. EMC recommendations for funding are forwarded to the State's Homeland Security Adviser, General Lowenberg, who is the Adjutant General for the State and Director of the Washington Military Department. General Lowenberg discusses the recommendations with the Domestic Security Executive Group (the Governor's public safety cabinet) and briefs the Governor on them. Funding decisions reside with the Adjutant General and the Governor - all other discussions are advisory. A remarkable degree of collaboration and trust exists between the local governments and the decision makers regarding the State's strategic plan and the objectives of all participants. Representatives are clearly aware of their obligation to fully brief their stakeholders at each stage of the review process.

Seattle is also one of the charter members, along with King County and the State, in the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI). Pierce County, Snohomish County and the City of Bellevue are also part of the Core UASI Group. This group deals with homeland security funds targeted to urban areas, and meets regularly to discuss security issues of mutual interest. Each jurisdiction assigns subject matter experts to a Working Group that reviews and prioritizes proposed measures submitted by each jurisdiction. The City of Seattle has a significant number of subject matter experts who participate fully in the Working Group activities. The UASI Core Group makes final recommendation regarding UASI funds. As charter members, the City of Seattle's Chief of Police and King County's Deputy County Executive may veto a recommendation. In such cases where there is a disagreement between these two governments about a recommendation, the Chair may break the tie. To date, the Chair has never had to use that tiebreaking authority. The process for making the final funding determination is essentially the same as the one described above, with the UASI Group reporting recommendations to the Homeland Security Adviser of the Governor, General Lowenberg, as prescribed by grant guidance.

TriData Recommendation #4	<p>The Emergency Management Bureau should consider working with the University of Washington to develop a GIS model of the areas of the City vulnerable to a Tsunami. If the risks are high, the City could develop strategies for mitigation (e.g., barriers, land use regulations and public education).</p>
Status: CLOSED	<p>The recommendation has been implemented. Geographic Information System (GIS) modeling for tsunamis has been completed. This analysis did not reveal a <i>high risk</i> of tsunamis. (Calculating risk takes the expected frequency, vulnerability and magnitude to an event into account. See below for details.)</p>
12/5/05 Executive Response	<p>Although there is significant controversy in the scientific community about the likelihood and impact of tsunamis in the Puget Sound inland waterways, the City is well aware of the tsunami modeling created by the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Association. The modeling does not yet exist as a useful GIS layer of information but rather an estimated animation. The difference of opinion revolves around whether to use ‘worst case’ or ‘maximum credible’ criteria as a design standard. Regardless, this has not prevented the City from investing in a new outdoor public warning system along the waterfront as a good measure of public safety planning.</p>
SPD Response:	<p>Since the 12/12/05 response sent to City Council, three GIS layers were developed by NOAA and Seattle Office of Emergency Management staff adjusted them to overlay more precisely with City of Seattle base layers and to simplify display.</p> <p>GIS modeling for tsunamis in this area has been completed. Although this analysis revealed <i>vulnerability</i> to tsunamis, it did not reveal a <i>high risk</i> of tsunamis (risk takes frequency, vulnerability and magnitude into account). The GIS modeling identified just two vulnerable areas in the City: around the stadiums and in Interbay. (Anywhere along the shoreline would also be really, really dangerous in a Seattle Fault-generated tsunami. It's just that in Interbay, SoDO and the Harbor Island area the tsunami would push far inland.) However, there are limitations to the GIS modeling because it doesn't take the built environment into account, especially the structural environment, such as bridges, etc., which would affect the water's pathway.</p> <p>A tsunami in Seattle is a low probability, high impact event. Unfortunately, we don't know enough about the frequency of tsunamis in this area to implement mitigation strategies or develop special building codes. We have one data point, which is a tsunami that occurred here 1,000 years ago. Given that frequency, it is not clear that we need to activate mitigation strategies here. Examples of</p>

	<p>mitigation strategies that have been implemented in other, higher risk areas include: not locating buildings in high risk areas, ensuring there are some rooms in each building above water level, ensuring there are good access routes out of the area. While the City hasn't completed a formal risk analysis for tsunamis, they have made policy decisions based on the GIS modeling. For example, they have chosen not to put critical facilities in areas that might be in a tsunami path.</p> <p>In the event of a tsunami, evacuation may not be the best response. Because a tsunami would be triggered by an earthquake, there would likely be very little time—at most a couple minutes—between the end of the shaking due to the earthquake and arrival of the tsunami. The best strategy under those circumstances would be for people to get up as high as they can in their buildings. This is what we teach in our training. To date, the City's response to a tsunami threat has included: public awareness, instituting a new warning system and carefully considering the siting of critical facilities.</p>
	<p>Seattle Department of Transportation (SDOT) Response: According to one SDOT official, SDOT does not have point-to-point evacuation plans for areas that could be affected by a tsunami. Instead, transportation planning for a tsunami is focused on emergency access following a tsunami event rather than the movement of large numbers of people out of the affected area before the event occurs.</p>

<p>TriData Recommendation #5</p> <p>The City should conduct further public education on the risks of windstorms with information from the Emergency Management Bureau. The City should allocate further resources to help the Bureau carry out this recommendation. Beyond monetary resources, public education resources could also include the Mayor making an address about how to respond to natural disasters and firefighters discussing the issues in schools.</p>	<p>Status: CLOSED</p> <p>The intent of the recommendation has been implemented. In the past year, additional funding has been allocated to emergency preparedness public education, including funding two new outreach staff. In addition, a new Public Education Coordinator for Emergency Preparedness was hired and a draft strategic plan for the area is currently under review.</p>	<p>12/5/05 Executive Response</p> <p>Additional Information Collected by the Office of Auditor</p> <p>Information on how to be safe and prepare for various disasters is incorporated into the City's public education programs. Many times similar preparations have multiple incident benefits.</p> <p>SPD response: Our emergency preparedness training teaches people to prepare for the <i>consequences</i> of an event. The disaster supplies you would need for a snowstorm, earthquake, or windstorm don't really differ, but the actions you might want to take could differ.</p>	<p>Our training also differentiates between disasters for which there is generally lots of warning (windstorms) and those for which there will be no warning (earthquakes). Much of our communication to the public about emergency preparedness for disasters <i>for which there is warning</i> happens in real time (preceding the event). For disasters for which there is warning, such as windstorms, we hold press conferences, often in conjunction with Seattle City Light and NOAA.</p> <p>SPD recently developed a general strategic plan for the City's public education and emergency preparedness which is more flexible than the previous approach. In this plan, we are broadening our outreach venues to include schools, day care centers, and informal groups as well as neighborhoods. This will allow us to take advantage of "teachable moments" by conducting trainings in response to individual and group requests, not just on a predetermined schedule to neighborhoods. We are also looking at training volunteers and community members to teach emergency preparedness, which will enhance our ability to reach as many citizens as possible. The strategic plan is in the draft stage and will be updated based on input from the new staff coming on board (see below).</p> <p>Thanks to the City Council (who funded 2 full-time positions), SPD will be hiring two additional staff members to help with public education and awareness. The Mayor's budget also provided \$100,000</p>
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to ensure that all City employees get emergency preparedness training.

Tridata Recommendation #6	The City needs to prepare to recover from extensive storm damage to structures, and should support new building codes that lessen the building damage.
Status: CLOSED	This recommendation has been implemented.
12/5/05 Executive Response	The building code has requirements addressing structural design for natural hazards such as wind, snow, and earthquakes. The City regularly adopts the latest versions of building codes.
Additional Information Collected by the Office of Auditor	<p>Department of Planning and Development (DPD) Response: As of June 2006, both the State of Washington and the City of Seattle have adopted and are implementing the 2003 International Building Code and 2003 International Residential Code. The 2003 International Building and Residential Codes changed the way wind and earthquake loads are calculated to make them more accurate. Theoretically, buildings constructed based on these load calculations should be more structurally sound.</p> <p>Office of City Auditor Note: We verified that the State of Washington adopted the 2003 International Building Code and 2003 International Residential Code. In July 2004, the City adopted both of these codes in Ordinance 121519 and 121521, respectively.</p>

<p>TriData Recommendation #7</p> <p>The Emergency Management Bureau should include information on tornado safety in the seismic information packets they distribute to residents. Information should include what a tornado is, what an individual should do if they sight one, and how to remain safe if an individual is in the path of a tornado. Much of this information can be gathered from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's website (http://www.noaa.gov/tornadoes.html).</p>	<p>Status: CLOSED</p> <p>The intent of the recommendation is in the process of being implemented. We see no barriers to its completion.</p> <p>12/5/05 Executive Response</p> <p>Information on how to be safe and prepared for the most probable hazards suggested by local hazard research is regularly modified to incorporate other relevant hazards such as terrorism and pandemic flu.</p> <p>Additional Information Collected by the Office of Auditor</p> <p>SPD response: The City's emergency preparedness printed and web-based information is in the process of being updated. The update should be completed by January 30, 2007. The website will offer a host of emergency preparedness information that is applicable, but not necessarily unique to severe weather. For example, having supplies and a plan is applicable to many hazards including severe weather. There will also be links to hazard specific information. The emergency preparedness training currently offered by the City is an all hazards approach, targeted specifically at our region's two greatest risks: earthquakes and severe weather. The City's utilities, SCL and SPU, also have public education programs for preparing for severe weather.</p> <p>National Weather Service response: Tornadoes are an infrequent event, but we do have a history of them here. The most recent one to touch down in the City was two years ago in West Seattle. An F2 level tornado went through the Wedgewood neighborhood in September 1962. An F3 level tornado came onshore in 1969 through Des Moines and ended up in the Kent valley. The second F3 to hit the area came through Vancouver, Washington on April 6, 1972 and killed 3 people and injured over 300. It was the deadliest tornado nationwide that year.</p> <p>The odds that a tornado will occur in this area are not very good (hence the assessment that they are a low probability) but they <u>do</u> occur. Information on how to respond to tornados should be part of the all-hazards emergency plan distributed to residents. If nothing else, it may help people live in the Seattle area only a short period of time, but subsequently move to areas where tornados are more frequent.</p>
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TriData Recommendation #8	The City should continue to identify effective ways to warn the public about impending natural disasters. This warning system could also be used for other more frequent events.
Status: CLOSED	This recommendation has been implemented. See below for description of the multiple systems in place to warn Seattle's citizens of pending disasters.
12/5/05 Executive Response	Although our biggest natural hazard is an earthquake for which there is no warning, the City does employ a number of public warning systems including the Emergency Alert System, an outbound telephone calling system, the Business Emergency Network, use of conventional media notifications, the outdoor public warning system, and public safety vehicle loudspeakers.
Additional Information Collected by the Office of Auditor	<p>SPD response: The Audible Public Warning System operates at three sites downtown along waterfront. It is used for tsunami warnings, or other hazards that might affect people outside on the waterfront. All three sites are in places that would reach large crowds. The warning system consists of an alarm and voice message.</p> <p>The <u>Business Emergency Network</u> uses existing hubs--business organizations and associations with large networks of clients—as conduits or distribution points through which to reach large groups of people. In an emergency, the City would contact the organization with information to distribute to their members. The organization then distributes the information, receives questions back, edits them for redundancy, and sends them on to the City's Emergency Operations Center (EOC). An example of an organization that is part of the Business Emergency Network is the Building Owners and Managers Association (BOMA). BOMA would primarily use e-mail to communicate with their members in an emergency, but does have back-up communications if need be. Another member of the Business Emergency Network is the federal government. The City provides information to a central contact in the federal government here in the region and it is distributed to all federal agencies in Seattle.</p> <p>The <u>Emergency Alert System</u> uses the mass media to warn citizens. It is the system you see or hear tested every month on TV and radio.</p> <p><u>NAWAS</u> is a special warning system that connects the federal government to the state and the city. In this case, in an emergency, the City is the recipient of information from the federal and/or state governments.</p>

The City of Seattle has as much public warning capability as any City in the United States. Of course, new technology is always coming available but we have to analyze our need for this technology against our available budget. We could use additional outdoor warning system capacity. For example, the Audible Public Warning System, which exists in three sites along the downtown waterfront, could be replicated in other areas of the City.

Department of Information Technology (DoIT) response:

Outbound telephone calling system

The City used \$760,000 in UASI 2 grant funds for two automated systems that could rapidly route a message to a massive number of phones. The City bought one system, known as the Community Notification System (CNS), which includes software, three servers, and a Qwest database of 1.9 million King County phone numbers. This system contains 216 phone lines that can quickly route a message to all of King County's phones. CNS is to be used only for emergencies. The Seattle Police Department is authorized to use the system for police-based emergencies while the Seattle Fire Department is authorized to use it for fire-based emergencies. The City purchased a similar system from a different vendor to serve as a back-up, and for SPU to use for non-emergency alerts of key City personnel for outages. Federal UASI funds paid for planning, software, hardware, and installation costs of the two systems.

Seattle Public Utilities (SPU) response: SPU purchased an upgraded version of its outbound messaging system, GeoCast, which is maintained by DoIT. This new system is used citywide and in conjunction with the Community Notification System.

Use of conventional media notifications

According to the City's principal public information officer for City-wide emergency management, the single message concept guides the City's public communications during emergencies. When the City's Emergency Operations Center (EOC) is activated, the standard operating procedure is for departments to cease issuing public information announcements and instead funnel everything through the EOC. The use of this procedure was the result of the City's negative experience with the November 1999 WTO event. The City used the single message approach to handle Y2K, the Nisqually earthquake, and during the 2003 TOPOFF2 exercise.

TriData Recommendation #9	The City should establish a plan to use private contractors to assist City forces in snow removal if necessary when the City's resources are overextended. It is not cost effective to have enough snow removal equipment for the infrequent, worst-case storms.
Status: CLOSED	SDOT reported that this recommendation cannot be implemented because local private contractors do not maintain snow removal equipment.
12/5/05 Executive Response	Regrettably, “private contractors” in this part of the nation do not maintain equipment and trained operators for snow removal functions. SDOT does, however, engage in mutual aid pacts with neighboring jurisdictions, King County DOT and with WSDOT to provide assistance in the event of extreme demands such as winter storms or volcanic ash. In a localized event partners in these mutual aid pacts will be able to assist one another. In a wide spread event SDOT will provide snow removal services to the City with all available equipment and crews operating on a 12 hrs on, 12 hrs off, 24 hour operation schedule.
Additional Information Collected by the Office of City Auditor	SDOT response: SDOT has open purchase order agreements with local contractors for 24 hour /7 days a week access to sand, salt and ice removal chemicals. Office of City Auditor Note: We reviewed the Seattle Department of Transportation’s (SDOT) Internal Snow and Ice Response Plan 2006-2007 and found that it contained information about the City of Seattle’s mutual aid agreements with the Washington State Department of Transportation (WSDOT) and King County. Appendix C contained agreements that A) Seattle would sell King County/Metro salt for snow removal purposes at cost if it was used within Seattle City limits, and B) that WSDOT would clear snow on the I-5 Express lanes.

TriData Recommendation #10	<p>The Transportation Department needs to plan better for snow and ice storms so that the system will be better able to respond to storm-related problems.</p>
Status: CLOSED	<p>SDOT stated that the substance of this recommendation was adequately addressed before the TriData study's publication. We agree that the recommendation has been addressed.</p>
12/5/05 Executive Response	<p>SDOT response: SDOT maintains a substantial and comprehensive “Snow and Ice Response Plan.” This plan is updated annually. The public SDOT Snow and Ice Plan can be reviewed at: http://www.seattle.gov/transportation/snowandiceplan.htm. SDOT also maintains a more detailed “internal” operating plan. Additionally, SDOT’s specialized winter storm equipment is maintained and brought into position for immediate service each autumn.</p> <p>Early each fall SDOT hosts an annual Snow and Ice Conference. This brings together agencies such as Police, public and private schools, hospitals, Emergency Management, Fire, Metro Transit, and others. At this conference the SDOT Snow and Ice Plan is distributed, presented and discussed. Critical corridors and arterials are reviewed to coordinate the needs and capabilities of those present. The 2006/2007 Conference was held at the Garfield Community Center on November 2, 2006. Approximately 55 people attended the conference. Attendees represented a variety of agencies, including King County Metro, Swedish Hospital, Harborview Medical Center, Pierce Transit, First Transit, Seattle Police Department, Washington State Department of Transportation, Fleets & Facilities, Human Services Department, Seattle Public Utilities, Community Transit, Day & Nite Towing, Seattle Office of Emergency Management, Northwest Hospital, Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center and the Seattle Fire Department.</p> <p>SDOT also annually prepares a Snow and Ice brochure for the public (http://www.seattle.gov/transportation/snowandice.htm). The brochure has a large map of Seattle’s snow and ice routes, lists important telephone numbers and web sites to use during winter storms, and offers preparedness tips. Printed versions of the brochure are available in English, Spanish, Chinese, Vietnamese, Cambodian, Tagalog, Somalian, Amharic, and Oromo.</p> <p>Office of City Auditor Note: We reviewed the latest version of the SDOT Snow and Ice Response Plan, and verified that it was updated in November 2006.</p>
Additional Information Collected by the Office of City Auditor	

TriData Recommendation #12	The City has put together a Landslide Policy Group and should include a GIS mapping subgroup to map the landslide prone areas of the City.
Status: CLOSED	GIS landslide mapping has occurred. See details below.
12/5/05 Executive Response	<p>Additional Information Collected by the Office of City Auditor</p> <p>SPU response: As explained in SPU's response to recommendation #11, SPU along with the Department of Planning and Development (DPD) have been funding the Seattle Mapping Project. This is an ongoing effort by the University of Washington to map the geology of the Seattle and surrounding area.</p> <p>USGS created landslide hazard maps of Seattle include the following:</p> <p><i>Landslide Susceptibility Estimated From Mapping Using Light Detection and Ranging (LIDAR) Imagery and Historical Landslide Records, Seattle, Washington [OF 05-1405]</i></p> <p>By William H. Schulz http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2005/1405/</p> <p><i>Landslides mapped using LIDAR imagery, Seattle, Washington [OF 04-1396]</i></p> <p>By William H. Schulz http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2004/1396/</p> <p><i>Preliminary map showing landslide densities, mean recurrence intervals, and exceedance probabilities as determined from historic records, Seattle, Washington [OF 00-303]</i></p> <p>by J.A. Coe, J.A. Michael, R.A. Crovelli, and W.Z. Savage Online Report: http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2000/ofr-00-0303/ Map: http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2000/ofr-00-0303/plate1.html</p> <p><i>Ground Reconnaissance of Landslide Activity in Seattle, Washington</i></p> <p>By Rex L. Baum, and Alan F. Chleborad http://landslides.usgs.gov/recent/archives/1997seattle.php</p> <p>Office of City Auditor Note: According to an SPU official, the USGS maps have been peer reviewed.</p>

TriData Recommendation #13	<p>The City should identify the resources that will be necessary to remove ash from risk areas. The City should use the GIS mapping model to develop ash fall-out locations within the City to better plan for the removal of ash. GIS mapping, in conjunction with wind currents, can help identify where the majority of ashes will fall.</p> <p>Status: CLOSED</p> <p>12/5/05 Executive Response</p> <p>SDOT reported that it had previously implemented the portion of this recommendation dealing with identification of ash removal resources, and that it disagreed with the Geographic Information System (GIS) portion of the recommendation.</p> <p>SDOT views the eventuality of a volcanic ash clean-up as a logical extension of a winter storm response. Constituent departments and agencies engaged in a winter storm event would be similarly engaged in an ash fall-out response. Priority corridors and arterial routes would be consistent with those identified in the Snow and Ice Plan. Snow removal equipment and crews would be deployed for ash clean-up.</p> <p>Additional Information Collected by the Office of City Auditor</p> <p>SDOT response: The handling and disposal of volcanic ash is significantly different than the handling and removal of snow. However, the same equipment and similar skills would be utilized. As with ice or snow, ash would be plowed and temporarily located so it does not impede traffic and the operation of the city. Snow and ice have the virtue of melting and “self-disposing” as the weather warms. Ash will have to be transported to a disposal site. While SDOT will be managing ash on roadways, streets and sidewalks, Seattle Public Utilities (SPU) will be dealing with ash removal on other public surfaces. As is the case with the clean-up of sand following a snow event, SDOT and SPU would work closely together to dispose of ash. An important difference in SDOT’s response to a volcanic ash inundation is the likelihood that the volcanic event would be without warning. In this case, SDOT may not have the opportunity to issue traveler advisory messages via the media in advance of the event.</p> <p>SDOT recognizes that a Geographical Information System (GIS) is useful for mapping natural and human caused events such as hazardous materials dispersions, that GIS has been utilized by SDOT, Seattle Fire Department, Seattle Police Department and other City entities. However, with the closest volcano more than 60 miles away from Seattle, and the dynamics of atmospheric conditions from surface to several miles high, the differences in particle size and density, effects of temperature variations as the ash moves across land and water, the likelihood of changing weather patterns as time passes, and a myriad of other influencing factors mean that attempting to predict locations within our city that would receive ash (and in varying amounts) using GIS mapping would be of no value.</p>
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	Indeed, any reliance of predictions based on GIS mapping would probably lead to confusion and inefficient use of resources.
	Office of City Note: An SPU GIS official stated that SDOT's assessment that GIS was not a good tool for predicting volcanic ash fall-out was reasonable.

Tridata Recommendation #14	Seattle should continue its membership in the National Flood Insurance Program and continue to study and fund mitigation efforts in the City.
Status: CLOSED	Part one of the recommendation, continued membership in the National Flood Insurance Program, has been implemented. Part two of the recommendation, to continue to study and fund mitigation efforts in the City, has not been implemented due to the City's low flood risk.
12/5/05 Executive Response	The City established eligibility in the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) in 1977. A community assistance visit ("CAV") culminated in the City's adoption of Council Bill 114503, which amended Seattle Municipal Code Chapter 25.06, the Seattle Floodplain Development Ordinance. The CAV determined that the City was compliant with all applicable regulations. Although the City will maintain its membership in NFIP, we are relatively low risk for flooding. Few areas within City limits are identified as being in a 100-year floodplain. They include areas in the South Park neighborhood, near the Duwamish, and the drainage basins for Thornton and Longfellow Creeks.
Additional Information Collected by the Office of Auditor	DPD response: DPD is not aware of any flood mitigation studies or efforts since the end of 2003. Office of City Auditor Note: We contacted FEMA's Flood Plan Programs Coordinator for the State of Washington, who confirmed that the City of Seattle is a member of the National Flood Insurance Program and has been one since 1977. He also confirmed that the City is at fairly low risk of flooding, and that most of the risk in Seattle is from urban (sub-grade garages, etc.) rather than catastrophic flooding.

TriData Recommendation #15	The City and the utilities need to work together to manage a water shortage emergency. The City needs to improve its ability to manage a prolonged multi-department emergency event for water shortages.
Status: CLOSED	SPU has implemented this recommendation.
12/5/05 Executive Response	<p>The City conducted two major exercises in the fall of 2004; one based on a power outage and the other based on a water shortage. Lessons learned from both exercises have been addressed by the Disaster Management Committee, Seattle City Light and Seattle Public Utilities.</p> <p>SPU Response: SPU has established partnerships with other city departments and regional agencies and works closely with these partners during a water shortage emergency. For example, in 2005, SPU successfully activated its Water Shortage Contingency Plan when Governor Gregoire declared a statewide drought emergency.</p>
Additional Information Collected by the Office of City Auditor	<p>SPU received Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) grant funds to develop several coordinated plans to respond to temporary water shortages related to the distribution system. Our Water Provisioning Plan involves coordination with Parks and SDOT as well as volunteer staffing from other city departments. The flexible temporary water hose was used in 2006 to prevent further damage to the water main in a landslide condition; and hardened hydrant locations have been established. The flexible temporary water hose is an above-ground water line called Large Diameter Hose (LDH). The benefit of the LDH is that it provides SPU water crews with much greater flexibility in how they can respond to water distribution emergencies, and it helps us maintain service to customers. SPU's supply of flexible LDH is divided into pre-cut segments that can be customized with couplings and adapters to fit the project needs. The seven pre-fabricated hose segments can be assembled into 127 different combinations, to create hose runs of 7 - 875 feet in seven foot increments. The photos below show the use of LDH during a landslide in West Seattle in January 2006. The water main was in jeopardy of breaking due to the landslide. As a preventative measure, the main was capped off and the water was diverted through the LDH.</p>



Office of City Auditor Note: We verified that one of the 2004 exercises dealt with water shortage scenarios, and that lessons learned from the exercise were incorporated by SPU, by reviewing SPU's *After Action Report from the 2004 Exercise for a Water Shortage Event* and the subsequent *Emergency Water Distribution Plan* developed by SPU.

TriData Recommendation #16 12/5/05 Executive Response	<p>The Public Utilities' "Water Supply Plan" should be expanded by using the excellent data sources available to the Utilities. The City should work more closely with the Utilities to manage the program.</p> <p>Status: CLOSED</p> <p>SPU has implemented this recommendation by making use of data sources from non-City entities.</p> <p>Additional Information Collected by the Office of City Auditor</p> <p>SPU's Water Supply plan relies heavily on a variety of monitoring resources such as the NWS and USGS to effectively determine the course of action during difficult water supply years. These resources are generally available to all city agencies free of charge. SPU is looking at how we can more effectively partner with these, and other agencies to effectively "operationalize" these tools for not only long-term water supply conditions, but also activities like localized flooding and landslide conditions.</p> <p>SPU response: SPU's current Water Shortage Contingency Plan (WSCP) 2000 specifically describes how SPU is already using the excellent data sources that are available, and how SPU works very closely with city, local, state, federal and tribal resource agencies. SPU and other agencies (such as City Light, King County, and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers) contract with the United States Geological Survey (USGS) via the USGS's federal cooperative stream gauging program. SPU provides a portion of the annual funds needed to install, operate and maintain a strategic network of continuous streamflow monitoring and data collection systems throughout the major river systems pertinent to managing Seattle's water supplies. SPU's partnership/cooperative program with the USGS has been in place since the late 1800's. A good general description of SPU's long-standing partnership / cooperation with NWS, USGS and other agencies can be found in Seattle Public Utilities' Water Shortage Contingency Plan 2000 (see Section 2 of that document). Available online at http://www.seattle.gov/util/About_SPUs/Water_System/Plans/index.asp.</p> <p>SPU has invested in, and continues to strategically improve, its systematic network of meteorological and hydrological monitoring and data collection systems providing real-time information for water managers on river and reservoir operations and conditions; and providing a long historical record of the data needed for performing longer term hydrologic and climatic trend analyses for the Cedar and Tolt Watersheds. These analyses help SPU plan and manage Seattle's water supplies both in the near term and for longer range regional water supply planning.</p> <p>Office of City Auditor Note: we reviewed page 4 of the Water Shortage Contingency Plan, which listed data sources SPU uses for managing the water supply (e.g., USGS, NRCS, and NOAA).</p>
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TriData Recommendation #18	The Emergency Management Bureau should ensure there is sufficient ventilation makeup air system in the new EOC before construction of the facility. Adequate air exchange must be provided to EOC staff during non-emergency and emergency events.
Status: CLOSED	The recommendation has been implemented.

12/5/05 Executive Response
Additional Information Collected by the Office of Auditor

Fleets and Facilities Department response: The design and ultimately the completed installation of the new Emergency Operations Center's (EOC) ventilating and exhausting systems is based on current code requirements as well as specific occupancy loading (number of people) of the spaces. The EOC's mechanical system has been fully reviewed and permitted by Seattle's Department of Planning and Development. Additionally, carbon dioxide sensors have been provided in the EOC that ensure adequate indoor air quality during intermittent high occupancy periods.

<p>TriData Recommendation #19</p> <p>Rated Urgent by TriData</p>	<p>A threat analysis must be performed for the site of the new EOC. The threat analysis should help the City decide what type of EOC facility is needed, what it should contain, who will be needed to operate it, and what type of site safety and security measures will be required. The EOC must be located and designed to withstand the most likely and most intense identified threat (short of a nuclear explosion near it).</p>
<p>Status: CLOSED</p> <p>12/5/05 Executive Response</p> <p>Additional Information Collected by the Office of Auditor</p>	<p>The recommendation has been implemented.</p> <p>A security study was conducted in 2004 as part of the pre-design process for the Fire Station 10 Project, which includes the Fire Alarm Center and the EOC.</p> <p>Fleets and Facilities Department response: The major findings of the security report indicated common crime to be the greatest threat to the EOC. The following additional threats were identified and listed in order of likelihood: disgruntled individuals, civil unrest, chemical spills, domestic terrorism and international terrorism. Additionally, the report indicated the adjacency of the Hygiene Center as a concern. The Hygiene Center is no longer planned for this facility.</p> <p>The EOC has been designed and is permitted as a threat aware, essential facility. The design responds specifically to natural disasters as well as civil events and emergencies. The details of these design components are withheld from public record as disclosure would have a substantial likelihood of threatening public safety.</p>

TriData Recommendation #20	The City must ensure that Heating, Ventilating, and Air Conditioning (HVAC) protection is addressed in the new EOC design. In addition to the obvious natural threats, the EOC staff and City leadership must consider hazardous materials incidents, air crashes, and incidents of criminal violence. Once a comprehensive list of threats has been developed, preferably through the cooperative input of various departments, the threats can be ranked in order of their likelihood of occurrence.
Status: CLOSED	The recommendation has been implemented. (Also see recommendation 18.)
12/5/05 Executive Response	Appropriate ventilation protection is being addressed in the design of the new Emergency Operations Center in concert with Fleets and Facilities, SPD, and Public Health.
Additional Information Collected by the Office of Auditor	Fleets and Facilities Department response: The HVAC system has been designed to address the need for specialized filtration and control of outside air as well as system redundancy. The EOC's heating, ventilating and exhaust systems are designed to operate during emergency conditions.

TriData Recommendation #21	The City should replace the outdated Command Vehicle currently used by the City. This vehicle should be replaced with a new vehicle that can be used for major disasters, fires, tactical situations, hazardous materials incidents, and major events requiring a coordination center and major crime situations. A state-of-the art command vehicle allows great flexibility when trying to manage an incident. Not only can it function as a forward command post, allowing front-line personnel to communicate directly with officials in the EOC, but it can also serve as an alternate EOC or communications center depending on the scope of the emergency being managed.
Status: CLOSED	The recommendation has been implemented. SPD has designed, ordered and will take delivery on a state-of-the-art command vehicle in December 2006.
12/5/05 Executive Response	The City's current fleet of command vehicles is more than adequate. In addition to five mobile precincts, the City has a state of the art Communications Van that can facilitate a broad platform for interoperable communications; the Fire Department has both incident command and support vehicles that can manage multiple, complex incident scenes; and the City will be taking delivery on a new incident management van and support vehicle through UASI grants within the next 6-9 months.
Additional Information Collected by the Office of Auditor	SPD response: SPD has designed, ordered and will take delivery on a state-of-the-art command vehicle in December 2006. However, a command vehicle is not necessarily the platform that would be used to stage a long-term emergency response. A preferred option might be SPD's Mobile Field Command Post, which consists of 4,400 sq. ft. of tents which are satellite networked and include briefing rooms and white boards and smart boards. The location and type of the command post chosen would vary depending on the complexity and duration of the emergency. The command vehicle would only be used in a very short term situation. SPD has also took delivery a year ago of a state-of-the-art communications vehicle which can dispatch communications to the entire region on the same frequency (band width). This vehicle has the same interoperability as the 911 Call Center and the Emergency Operations Center (EOC).

<p>TriData Recommendation #22</p> <p>The City needs to continue to improve its communications redundancy with additional back up systems (radio, telephone, NEXTEL, amateur radio personnel, etc.). The investment in time and research into what happens when critical communication systems are damaged will more than pay off later when the EOC continues to function despite specific system outages.</p>	<p>Status: CLOSED</p> <p>The City has improved its communications redundancy, and will seek further opportunities to increase it.</p> <p>12/5/05 Executive Response</p> <p>The City's communication array is comprised of at least nine redundant layers, including interoperable portable radios that operate both via repeater and as simplex radios; two separate cell phone networks; satellite phones; handheld blackberries; pagers; e-mail; video teleconferencing between emergency operations and control centers; and contract arrangements with telecommunications vendors to provide rapid support (e.g. Cellular on Wheels). Please note that this region has one of the most substantial platforms for interoperable communications in the country.</p> <p>DOIT response: DOIT and other City departments are continually looking for communications technologies that can increase the City's current highly redundant communications systems. The interoperability of these systems is tested periodically by DOIT, the Seattle Police Department, and the Seattle Fire Department.</p> <p>For more information on the King County Regional 800 MHz radio network, go to the following website: http://www.metrokc.gov/emp/800MHz.htm.</p> <p>Additional Information Collected by the Office of City Auditor</p> <p>Office of City Auditor Note: Through field visits and interviews, we verified the City's possession of the communications systems listed in the 12/5/05 Executive Response to this recommendation. This includes the 800 MHz radio system, telephones (land line), cellular telephone, satellite telephones, blackberries, pagers, email, video teleconferencing, and mobile computers with wireless connectivity.</p>
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TriData Recommendation #23	A new EOC needs to be designed and built immediately, replacing the inadequate facility at Station 2.
Rated Urgent by TriData	
Status: Closed	Implementation of this recommendation is in process. We see no barriers to its completion.
12/5/05 Executive Response	A new EOC, one element of the recent successful Fire Levy, is nearing design completion and should be constructed by early 2007.
Additional Information Collected by the Office of Auditor	Fleets and Facilities Department response: The construction of the EOC started in February 2006, and it is currently 30% complete. The facility is scheduled to be occupied in the 4 th Quarter of 2007. There are no current barriers to its on-time construction.

TriData Recommendation #24	The EOC Operations Room must be designed and built to comply with the building codes and must address all local hazards. All department and agency representatives must be able to get to and work in the operations room during an emergency.
Status: CLOSED	The portion of the recommendation concerning design has been implemented. Implementation of the building portion of the recommendation is in process. We see no barriers to its completion.
12/5/05 Executive Response	Agreed. All elements of the new EOC will comply with building codes, which in turn are based on local hazards.
Additional Information Collected by the Office of Auditor	Fleets and Facilities Department response: The design of the EOC is in full compliance with all applicable building codes. The design has been fully permitted by Seattle's Department of Planning and Development. The facility is located adjacent to the Civic Core and is accessible by a multiplicity of routes.

TriData Recommendation #25	In the new EOC, emergency power generators should be provided that are large enough to supply all of the building HVAC, power needs and have a minimum of four days reserve fuel. The unit should be located so that its noise and fumes do not interfere with the EOC operations.
Status:	The intent of the recommendation has been implemented.
12/5/05 Executive Response	Emergency generator will supply the buildings' HVAC and power needs and have a minimum of 72 hours reserve fuel.
Additional Information Collected by the Office of Auditor	Fleets and Facilities Department response: The HVAC equipment has been strategically located with respect to noise and exhaust and will not interfere with the EOC operations. The City's determination of a 72 hour reserve fuel supply was made during schematic design and was based on the inclusion of a mobile generator port, the ability to requisition fuel and parity with other King County facilities.

<p>TriData Recommendation #26</p> <p>Rated Urgent by TriData</p>	<p>The City needs to immediately implement a comprehensive security plan that includes a central control center. Monitoring security for many buildings at one central location provides better security and can save money; one person can monitor multiple buildings.</p>
<p>Status: CLOSED</p>	<p>The Executive does not intend to implement this recommendation. Due to the wide variation in the types and uses of city-owned facilities, and the City's decentralized system of facility management, based on departmental authority, one central control center that governs security at all City facilities does not appear to be the best option.</p>
<p>12/5/05 Executive Response</p>	<p>There is a comprehensive security system in place for the City's Civic Center facilities, which includes a central control center. Security provisions for other City buildings are varied based upon the nature of the facility, its use and an assessment of its threat exposure. Security for their operating facilities is most appropriately handled by operating departments, e.g., security for public utility facilities and infrastructure is under the control of the utility departments, as noted in the Public Utilities section.</p>
<p>Additional Information Collected by the Office of Auditor</p>	<p>Fleets and Facilities Department (FFD) response: FFD has a comprehensive security plan and a single point of management and oversight for the security it provides at all of the Civic Center buildings. While the Seattle Municipal Tower (SMT) has a separate control center, security information is shared and coordinated and security planning and implementation are centralized. In addition to the security planning and operations FFD provides, Seattle Public Utilities and Seattle City Light have additional security provisions specific to their operational requirements.</p> <p>All of the Civic Center facilities are monitored; as noted above, SMT has a separate control center but security is coordinated with the other Civic Center facilities, i.e., Seattle City Hall and the Justice Center.</p> <p>Security at the Civic Center and at many other City facilities is provided with the support of security service contracts with private sector security firms. As such, the City utilizes the expertise and professional expertise of these firms. Similarly, FFD has a close working relationship with the Seattle Police Department, including the Crime Prevention Unit, to apply their expertise in developing and maintaining our security plans.</p>

TriData Recommendation #29	<p>For the protection of all government facilities, Seattle should adopt the Federal Government's security design standards. These would provide a blueprint for the reasonable response to correct the security problems highlighted both in this section and the Olympic Security Services report (**Note: the Olympic Security Services security survey report of the City was issued in November 1998).</p> <p>Status: CLOSED</p> <p>12/5/05 Executive Response</p> <p>Additional Information Collected by the Office of Auditor</p>
	<p>The Federal Government's security design standards were intended for high-risk facilities and, in the Executive's view, are not appropriate for all City facilities.</p> <p>The City will evaluate the appropriateness of federal security design standards for the development or renovation of certain City facilities, noting that many of these guidelines are intended for high-risk facilities, like embassies.</p> <p>SPD response: The City has evaluated these guidelines, and determined that, since they were designed for foreign embassies, they are too stringent and are not applicable to Seattle.</p> <p>FFD response: Multiple departments are responsible for design and implementation facility projects; these projects are highly variable ranging from community facilities to utility infrastructure to emergency response facilities. As such, security requirements and provisions are not uniform and the administering departments would be best suited to identify the nature of the facility and select the appropriate security design to incorporate into the facility.</p>

TriData Recommendation #30	A comprehensive building security survey should be conducted to determine where the City is now and where it wants to be in five years, in light of the above concerns.
Status: CLOSED Rated Urgent by TriData	Planning for, and management of, the City's building security needs is handled on a decentralized basis by the responsible department. The City does not intend to conduct a comprehensive security study.
12/5/05 Executive Response	Security at major City facilities has been reviewed. The City has made, and continues to make, adjustments and improvements to its security provisions and new facility design and major renovations include evaluation of security measures appropriate to the nature of the facility.
Additional Information Collected by the Office of Auditor	<p>FFD response: FFD's security manager and our contracted security account managers constantly evaluate the security of Civic Center facilities and make adjustments accordingly.</p> <p>During programming, design and construction, protecting the security of the physical asset, the employees and the public is an extremely important consideration and project managers ensure that security provisions are addressed, as appropriate to the specific project.</p>

TriData Recommendation #31	An integrated building security plan should be the foundation for security-related budget requests.
Status: CLOSED	Planning for, and management of, the City's building security needs is handled on a decentralized basis by the responsible department. Budget items related to building security are incorporated into the regular departmental budget process.
12/5/05 Executive Response	The current budget development and review process provides for a detailed evaluation of security-related budget requests and how those requests would contribute to improving building security.
Additional Information Collected by the Office of Auditor	FFD response: Budget items related to building security are incorporated into the regular departmental budget process.

TriData Recommendation #32	If continued, the homeless program's use of the municipal building should be closely monitored through the use of personal searches, a screening process, and patrolling the building. This will lessen the risk of liability, police hazard, and security issues.
Status: CLOSED	The intent of the recommendation has been implemented—i.e., additional measures have been taken to reduce security risks when the Winter Shelter Program is in effect.
12/5/05 Executive Response	Severe weather shelter capacity has been completed at the new City Hall. Security provisions include controlled access, security monitoring and patrol. Personal searches and screening are not consistent with City policy or state law regarding public facilities.
Additional Information Collected by the Office of Auditor	FFD response: See December 12, 2005 response regarding security provisions in place for the Winter Shelter Program at Seattle City Hall. On nights when the Winter Shelter Program is used, there are extra security personnel on site, there is limited access to the building, the entrance to the building is controlled, additional security video monitoring occurs, and everyone must leave at the same time in the morning.

Office of City Auditor Note: We confirmed with the City Attorney's Office that the use of unauthorized personal searches could put the City at risk of violating an individual's constitutional rights under the U.S. Constitution's 4th Amendment.

TriData Recommendation	If continued, the feed program should also be closely monitored through the use of personal searches, a screening process, and patrols of the City Park.
Status: CLOSED	No longer applicable: the meals program has been discontinued at the City's Civic Center Building Plaza).
12/5/05 Executive Response	The meals program has been discontinued at the City's Civic Center (formerly at the Public Safety Building Plaza).
Additional Information Collected by the Office of Auditor	FFD response: There are currently no meal programs being offered at City facilities and none are contemplated.

<p>TriData Recommendation #35</p>	<p>The policy regarding an owner's right to determine if a search or evacuation for WMD is to happen should be revisited, especially during periods of emergency where there is the possibility of interruption of police operations. The police and businesses need to work together to ensure no mass evacuation occurs without coordination. The Police Department and Fire Department should educate business owners regarding the safety issues presented by unsupported WMD evacuations.</p>
<p>Status: CLOSED</p>	<p>The intent of the recommendation has been implemented. SPD and SFD have policies and procedures for dealing with building evacuation, and regularly coordinate with local building owners, including providing them training on building evacuation.</p>
<p>12/5/05 Executive Response</p> <p>SPD and SFD have the authority to search a building, order an evacuation or take other reasonable protective measures if they find a suspicious package or otherwise have a reasonable basis to suspect that a bomb or WMD device is present on private property. If this reasonable likelihood does not exist, then it is in the discretion of the building owner to take proactive measures. In either event, we always coordinate and assist building owners/managers as part of our public safety response.</p> <p>SPD response: This recommendation makes more sense for a jurisdiction, such as Washington, D.C., where they have greater statutory authority over private building owners. In Seattle, before intervening, SPD needs a reasonable belief that a package might be a problem; otherwise we can't compel an evacuation of a building. SPD works through many different mechanisms to inform building owners how to deal with emergencies, including the Building Owners and Managers Association (BOMA), the Downtown Seattle Association, the Precinct Level and Citywide Advisory Councils, and Crime Prevention Districts. BOMA is the most efficient way to communicate with building owners, and SPD officials have addressed this group about emergency preparedness issues. SPD also has a crime prevention analyst assigned to work on business security issues.</p> <p>SPD follows national standards regarding evacuation standards and distances. The two most important sets of evacuation standards were developed by the National Fire Safety Board and the Federal Board of Standards for Bomb Technicians.</p> <p>The City of Seattle's 911 Call Center follows specific procedures if they receive a call regarding a suspicious package in a building. The Field Commander in charge of the incident, typically an SPD captain, will contact the owners/managers of adjoining buildings to let them know what action they should take. Per federal standards, there is always a liaison appointed to communicate the Field Commander's recommendations regarding evacuation to the building owners.</p>	

BOMA response: The Seattle Police Department (SPD) has held numerous training sessions for BOMA over the years, and also trains building security officers. For example, SPD and the Seattle Fire Department (SFD) participated in a large shelter and place evacuation seminar we held last year and were very helpful. In addition, we have had various SPD personnel come talk to our group, including Chief Kimmerer and Barb Graff. In the past year, Barb has spoken to our general membership twice, and at least four times to other BOMA groups. For example, in February she spoke before all BOMA chief engineers. SPD personnel also meet individually with BOMA members or conduct joint exercises with them at their request. In addition, Barb set up the Business Emergency Network to communicate during a crisis. SPD actively supports our members with emergency preparedness issues.

BOMA members are familiar with what to do in the case of a bomb or weapons of mass destruction (WMD) scare because any high rise building in the City must comply with the Seattle Fire Code, Chapter 93, Minimum Standards for High Rise Buildings. All high rise buildings have bomb procedures and many times the industry hires their own consultants to assist building owners and managers in emergency preparedness. There is not one prescriptive set of guidelines on what to do in an emergency, because every site is different and therefore the response must be tailored to that particular site. To require a rigid set of responses is probably not the way to go.

Office of City Auditor Note: We reviewed the following chapters and sections of the Seattle Fire Code:

- Chapter 93, Minimum Standards for High Rise Buildings
- Chapter 4, Emergency Planning and Preparedness (sections 404: Fire Safety and Evacuation Plans and High Rise Emergency Operations Plans, 405: Emergency Evacuation Drills, and 406: Employee Training and Response Preparedness).

These can be viewed at <http://www2.iccsafe.org/states/Seattle/>. The code outlines the responsibility high rise building owners have to establish evacuation procedures, train their employees in emergency preparedness, and conduct drills.

TriData Recommendation	A general order should be issued reminding officers about wearing nametags.		
#36	Status: CLOSED	The recommendation has been implemented.	
12/5/05 Executive Response		This is City and Department policy. All employees have been provided written directives ordering compliance with this policy. Failure to adhere to this policy can result in discipline.	
Additional Information Collected by the Office of Auditor		<p>Office of City Auditor Note: Section 1.185 of SPD's Policies and Procedures Manual, which pertains to uniforms and equipment, clearly states:</p> <p>"Department issued (block print) cloth nametags shall be worn by each on-duty uniformed officer on the uniform shirt and optional sweater. Plastic nametags shall be worn with the uniform blouse. Officers shall also wear Department issued cloth nametags on the uniform jacket and utility uniform. (See Section 1.185a – Uniform Illustrations for proper name tag placement.)</p> <p>The required nametag or identification device shall be worn on the outermost layer of the uniform, in the upper front torso area, and shall be clearly visible to the public."</p>	

TriData Recommendation	There should be no aggressive attempt, other than verbal warnings, to separate lawful from unlawful demonstrators.
Status: CLOSED	SPD does not agree with the recommendation and does not intend to implement it.
12/5/05 Executive Response	<p>This statement is likely in conflict with state law and legal precedent. A blanket requirement this vague and symbolic might result in people getting hurt.</p> <p>SPD response: How to handle crowd control in an emergency situation is a complicated tactical and strategic decision. Under the City's Charter, the SPD Police Chief has the power to determine how to deal with demonstrators. The fundamental policy behind crowd control and demonstrations is "never say never." Although SPD has no formal policy on how to handle crowds in an emergency, SPD tactically deploys resources according to the priorities established by the National Incident Management System's (NIMS) Incident Command System (ICS) standards. These priorities are: 1) life and safety, 2) incident stabilization, and 3) property conservation. The Field Commander-in-Charge decides on the most prudent, reasonable steps to take based on these three priorities.</p> <p>State statute RCW9A.16.020 gives sworn law enforcement officers the authority to make decisions about the use of force. This statute dictates that in order to use force, there be no reasonable alternative. Any constraints placed on officers would have to stand up to judicial review under this statute.</p> <p>To ensure everyone's safety, it is important that the SPD Field Commander in charge of a given situation be free to assess the best course of action. In general, it is not wise to limit the tools an officer has in his/her toolbox. Under the City's charter, laws were designed to permit reasonable decision-making by law enforcement officers. State statutes define the criteria under which force may be used and define what "reasonable force" is considered to be under the law.</p>

TriData Recommendation #38	Every SPD employee should receive a copy of the emergency management manuals and orders, and be held accountable for knowing the portions that pertain to them.
Status: CLOSED	This practice should also be carried out by the other ESF responding agencies and departments. The intent of the recommendation has been implemented. The Incident Command System (ICS), as adopted and implemented by SPD, provides officers and their commanders with information on what to do in emergencies. All nine Emergency Support Functions ⁵ (ESFs) participated in the development of the City's Disaster Readiness Plan, which contains emergency policies and procedures, and have received copies of it.
12/5/05 Executive Response	All SPD employees are issued a complete manual, including policies and procedures concerning emergency management requirements. Policy and procedural changes and additions are issued in writing. All employees are responsible for knowing and adhering to Department policies. Failure to abide by Department policies can result in discipline, including suspension and termination.
Additional Information Collected by the Office of Auditor	SPD response: Title 4 of the SPD Manual governs emergency procedures for police officers; it is quite long. This manual is continuously updated, as new requirements are issued under the Homeland Security Act. All new SPD employees are given copies of this manual and are required to read it as well as sign for their copy. Compliance with this requirement is monitored through the employee evaluation process. In the manual it states that employees are required to read the manual.

The amendments to the City's Disaster Readiness Plan also contain emergency policies and procedures. This plan describes which agencies act as the nine ESF (emergency support function) agencies in the city. All 9 ESFs participated in the development of the Disaster Readiness Plan and have received copies of it. A copy of the Disaster Readiness Plan can be found on the City's Web site, however, the annexes, which contain specific operational procedures, are confidential. Check out http://www.cityofseattle.net/emergency_mgt/resources/plans.htm. The second revision of the Disaster Readiness Plan, which is the latest version approved by the City Council, incorporates all the provisions and provisos of the Homeland Security Act.

Office of City Auditor Note: We reviewed Title 4 of the Seattle Police Department Emergency

⁵ Emergency Support Functions (ESF) are functional areas of response activity established to facilitate the delivery of city, state, and federal assistance required during the immediate response phase of a disaster. The City of Seattle's Emergency Operations Center contains nine ESFs: 1) Emergency Management, 2) Law Enforcement; 3) Public Works, 4) Fire, Rescue, and Emergency Medical Services, 5) Emergency Public Information, 6) Human Services, 7) Logistical Services, 8) Health, Medical and Mortuary, and 9) Long-term Recovery and Unmet Needs.

	<p>Operations Manual, dated May 31, 2006. (This section of the Manual is currently under review by SPD management. Once that review has been completed, it will be distributed to all first responders.) The manual is based on the Incident Command System, use of which is mandated by Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8. Our review verified that it is based on the Incident Command System mandated by the National Incident Management System and HSPD 8, and is directed at the Field Commander level.</p> <p>We also reviewed <u>SPD's Policy and Procedure Manual</u>, dated <u>8/1/96</u>, and verified that an officer's duties during an emergency are clearly outlined in the manual.</p>
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TriData Recommendation	Stockpile more than anticipated quantities of supplies at several locations.
#40 Rated Urgent by TriData	
Status: CLOSED	The recommendation has been implemented.
12/5/05 Executive Response	SPD currently stockpiles a responsible level of necessary personal protective equipment.

SPD response: Every sworn officer has a complete set of personal protective gear, which stays with the officer. This equipment includes a PPO (personal protective outfit), demonstration/hard gear, and a gas mask. Stores of chemicals and ammunition are kept at six different locations in the City, including the five precincts (the South and Southwest Precincts share a location), and the Park 95 building in Seattle's Georgetown's district and the SPD Shooting Range located on East Marginal Way in Seattle. In addition, all sergeants carry extra ammunition. We probably have five times the chemical and non-lethal munitions we need stockpiled, and 100 times the ammunition we need at the Range. These locations are easily accessible during an emergency.

<p>TriData Recommendation #41</p> <p>If an SPD officer is not going to be available for a training class, and it cannot be filled by another SPD officer, then private security personnel and police from other jurisdictions should be allowed to attend the class. This increases the efficiency of training, and provides a larger cadre of security forces trained for emergency management.</p>	<p>Status: Closed</p> <p>SPD has implemented the intent of this recommendation.</p> <p>SPD has initiated and hosted literally hundreds of classes, seminars and other training. We regularly invite other jurisdictions and personnel. It is rare when a class is not completely full with our own and partner agency personnel.</p> <p>SPD response: Although we could fill the classes ourselves, we usually reserve slots for other agencies. However, SPD does not have an official policy or guideline for providing training to non-City personnel. Rather, we rely upon existing communication networks to advertise classes on a case-by-case basis, depending on the training needs of our officers.</p> <p>One example of an existing communication network we use is attending the monthly meeting of police training commanders from around the county. Training opportunities are shared at this meeting. In addition, SPD is on a monthly routing system with Snohomish County, which allows us to share classes and even trainers with the County.</p> <p>It's rare that a class is not filled. One thing we don't do is offer training to private security operations because much of the course work doesn't pertain to them; however, this is something we would like to do.</p> <p>Our "Street Skills" course is a required four-day course that all officers must take each year. It is offered every week, with an optimal enrollment of 24 students. We generally try and fill all our classes and are happy to offer empty slots to officers from other agencies. Unfortunately, we can't always predict when we'll have empty slots. Often, officers enrolled in a course are called away at the last minute for a court appointment.</p> <p>We are unable to provide hard data on the number of outside officers who participate in our training classes because we don't track their attendance. Our class sign-in sheets are primarily used to update SPD training records.</p>

<p>TriData Recommendation #42</p> <p>Seattle Emergency Management and the Police Department should develop a cooperative agreement to ensure that Guard management personnel participate in the strategic planning process for the deployment of National Guard resources. Of course a dialogue is also needed with the Guard in the setting of policy that relates to it.</p>	<p>Status: CLOSED</p> <p>The intent of the recommendation has been implemented. SPD works closely with the Washington State National Guard on emergency planning.</p> <p>This process is administered through the State Office of Emergency Management and the Office of Adjutant General Tim Lowenberg, with whom we have an exemplary relationship.</p> <p>SPD response: State law dictates the nature of the City of Seattle's relationship with the National Guard. For example, we participate with the National Guard on special committees, such as the Committee on Homeland Security. It is not possible for the City of Seattle to develop a cooperative agreement with the National Guard outside of these official venues.</p> <p>SPD does not have the authority to deploy the National Guard. That fundamental decision is up to the State. There is no State statute that creates an obligation on the part of the State to activate the Guard. Deploying the National Guard to Seattle would require a Mayoral Proclamation and an agreement with the Governor. We asked the National Guard to conduct their semi-annual training during WTO so that they would be "stood up" (ready for deployment) in case we needed them, but our request was denied.</p> <p>While we do not have a cooperative agreement with the National Guard that outlines specifically how they would be deployed if we needed them, we have a cooperative relationship with Adjutant General Tim Lowenberg, Director of the State Office of Emergency Management, and the head of the Washington State National Guard. Strategic planning with the National Guard occurs within the venues of existing planning efforts. For example, General Lowenberg is the Chair of the Committee on Homeland Security, which conducts statewide emergency planning. In addition, there was a Guard representative assigned to the City's Emergency Operations Center during the TOPOFF exercises.</p> <p>State of Washington response: The state Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (CEMP) sets in place a well practiced procedure for providing assistance to local jurisdictions during emergencies and disasters. When a jurisdiction's need for resources to respond to emergencies exceeds its capability (including the use of mutual aid), the jurisdiction requests assistance from the</p>
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state. The state Emergency Operations Center coordinates that request, first using state resources and then activating state to state mutual aid agreements. Requesting federal resources is also an option depending on the situation.

If the Governor declares an emergency, then in accordance with RCW 38.52 and 43.06, the Washington National Guard is one of the state resources that become available. The decision to fill the resource request with National Guard resources rests with the state not the local jurisdiction.

RCW 38.52 and WAC 118.30 govern the emergency planning process within the state. Local jurisdiction comprehensive emergency management plans undergo periodic review by the state Emergency Management Division for compliance with those directives.

Washington National Guard response: The National Guard can only be invoked in response to the Governor's declaration of emergency, as required by law under RCW Title 38. National Guard personnel are federal employees and can only be deployed consistent with federal law and regulation. Federal law stipulates that the Guard can only be deployed if there is imminent threat to life or property and the Governor has officially declared an emergency.

The Washington National Guard has an excellent relationship with the Chief of the Seattle Police Department and City of Seattle administrators. Contingency planning between the Guard and the City is done within existing venues, such as the Committee on Homeland Security. Seattle has a special voting seat on that Committee and Adjutant General Timothy Lowenberg, head of the Washington State National Guard, is the Chair of the Committee.

Office of City Auditor Note: Information on when and how the City can request military support during emergencies is covered in Appendix 2 of the City's Disaster Readiness and Response Plan, which can be found at http://www.cityofseattle.net/emergency_mgt/resources/plans.htm

TriData Recommendation #43	Senior Police Department leadership, including internal department heads, should document operational issues and difficulties with SOPs; the City should address these concerns as soon as is practical.
Status: CLOSED	The recommendation has been implemented.
12/5/05 Executive Response	<p>The most recent revision to the City Disaster Readiness Plan addressed most of the outstanding issues concerning the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) of all City Departments concerning emergency management.</p> <p>SPD response: SPD's Emergency Operations Information Manual is aimed at the Field Commander level—sergeants, lieutenants, captains, etc. SPD is a paramilitary organization, which means that every officer doesn't need to know exactly what the policies and procedures are in a given emergency. This wouldn't be appropriate anyway, given that the Field Commander will decide on a course of action in response to his/her assessment of ongoing events. To do this, the Field Commander chooses from the continuum of available tools. These tools are comprehensive and state-of-the-art and are chosen by the Field Commander according to the principles of incident management.</p> <p>SPD also complies with the principles of Incident Management Training (IMT) in that it has specially trained cadres of officers who are brought in after the incident has been stabilized. SPD also complies with the requirements of NIMS and the Homeland Security Act, as outlined in the 7 Emergency Preparedness Directives contained in HSPD 8.</p> <p>Office of City Auditor: We reviewed the SPD's Emergency Operations Manual, dated 5/31/06 (which is still under review by SPD management) and verified that it is based on the Incident Command System mandated by NIMS and HSPD 8 and directed at the Field Commander level. We also reviewed SPD's Policy and Procedure Manual, dated 8/1/96, and verified that an officer's duties during an emergency are clearly outlined.</p>

TriData Recommendation #44	A survey of mutual aid departments and agencies should be conducted with the goal of compiling data referencing their response and readiness plans. The Emergency Operations Plan does not currently reflect this information.
Status: CLOSED	<p>The intent of the recommendation has been implemented.</p> <p>Mutual aid compacts are well established and have been utilized with some frequency. The state Mutual Aid Police Powers Act establishes legal jurisdiction and police authority for all duly sworn peace officers to operate as mutual aid resources. Disaster plans among mutual aid agencies conform to federal and state standards, in particular ICS and NIMS (National Incident Management System)</p> <p>SPD response: We agree with the spirit but not the letter of this recommendation. A survey of mutual aid departments and agencies isn't necessary because we communicate with one another through our joint participation on the state/regional Committee for Homeland Security. Since all jurisdictions must comply with the requirements of the Homeland Security Act, our response and readiness are standardized in key areas. All agencies in the state have state emergency management requirements they must comply with. In addition, the federal ICS and NIMS have standard procedures. So all agencies in Washington State share state and federal ICMS and NIMS standards.</p>

<p>TriData Recommendation #45</p> <p>A color code should be established that would be part of an individual's identification card to indicate whether the person was essential personnel and authorized to re-enter a facility during an emergency. To refer to a written list or to check the name with a dispatcher is not always feasible during an emergency.</p>	<p>Status: CLOSED</p> <p>The intent of the recommendation has been implemented.</p> <p>The City has gone to a standard identification card. This system has been used successfully during the various homeland security alerts and other security conditions that have occurred in Seattle over the last 3 years. The key to access control is not a “color code,” but rather the presence of trained personnel (including sworn law enforcement) at entry points to screen admittance based upon reliable identification. We have such a system, which has been used successfully (e.g., TOPOFF).</p> <p>SPD response: While some City IDs are color-coded (e.g., SPD – blue and SFD – red), we do not rely on that coding for our security purposes during emergencies. Rather, as during the TOPOFF exercise, SPD uses an enhancement sticker—a decal that goes on the ID and can't be transferred. This system worked well during TOPOFF. In addition, we have an agreement with an outside vendor who can create additional forms of credentialing on very short notice.</p> <p>All City personnel must have their City IDs visible during emergencies. We believe that our current system allows us to achieve same objective without requiring a color code.</p>
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TriData Recommendation #46	The City should move forward with the proposed levy for the upgrade, replacement, and/or renovation of stations in the current program. This should include the relocation of the Emergency Operations Center from Fire Station 2 to a new location.
Status: CLOSED	SFD and FFD are in the process of implementing this recommendation. We see no barriers to its completion.
12/5/05 Executive Response	<p>Seattle passed the Fire Levy in November 2003 providing construction or upgrading of 32 Fire Stations, a training facility, a new Fire Alarm Center, two new Fire boats, a new EOC and other disaster readiness measures.</p> <p>SFD response: Construction has started on the new City Emergency Operations Center (EOC), the Joint Training Facility has been constructed and is in use, one grant funded fireboat has entered service and the other is more than eighty percent complete, and should be delivered in late December 2006 or early January 2007. An existing fireboat is scheduled for retrofit in 2007. The first four neighborhood station projects are in pre-design.</p> <p>Fleets and Facilities Department response: The fire stations will be equipped to provide emergency in-house power, storage of emergency supplies (including water and medical equipment), and emergency shelter. The Fire Station 10 project, which includes the Emergency Operations Center and the Fire Alarm Center, is forty percent complete. The first four neighborhood station projects are in pre-design, design firms for the next eight stations were selected in November 2006. Information on the fire station construction program can be found at the following City website:</p> <p style="text-align: right;">http://www.seattle.gov/fleetsfacilities/firelevy/statusreports.html</p>

TriData Recommendation #48	<p>The Fire Department, Hazardous Materials Response Team, and the Emergency Management Bureau should develop an apparatus and equipment replacement plan for the Hazardous Materials Response Team. The two units and the City Council might consider using grant funds or a percentage collected from hazmat operation revenue to form a Capital Equipment and Apparatus replacement program for the Hazardous Materials Response Team. One way or another, the Fire Department Hazardous Materials Response Unit (Unit 77) needs to be up-graded and replaced in a timely manner. The replacement vehicle should be designed as a state-of-the-art hazard risk assessment support vehicle. This unit should contain computers and printers equipped with software necessary to provide chemical information databases, mapping programs of the entire City and region, a computerized weather station, an elaborate communications network of radios and telephones, and contain video cameras mounted on telescoping masts to enable responders to visualize the affected area from a safe distance until necessary scientific data can be compiled to establish the safest, most efficient plan to mitigate the incident.</p>	<p>Status: CLOSED</p>	<p>SFD purchased a new HazMat unit vehicle.</p> <p>SFD has implemented a life-cycle tracking system utilizing barcodes and data management tools to implement programmed replacement of hazardous materials response equipment. SFD has obtained grant funding to replace the existing Haz Mat Unit with a new Unit (available in late 2006).</p> <p>SFD response: SFD, in collaboration with the Fleets and Facilities Department, has established a replacement plan for the Hazardous Materials Response apparatus. A federal grant allowed SFD to order a HazMat Unit replacement vehicle, which is now in service. The new vehicle contains computers, printers and software necessary to provide chemical information databases, as well as a plume modeling capability (CAMEO). A weather station will also be installed on the vehicle.</p> <p>Equipment, including detection, decontamination, product identification, and mitigation equipment, as well as personal protective equipment for Firefighter HazMat Technicians, will be transferred from the current HazMat Unit vehicle to the new one.</p> <p>While the new vehicle will have radio and cell phone technology, there was not enough funding available to equip the vehicle with satellite connectivity or a video downlink for real time incident information. The cost of the satellite link and video down/up link is approximately \$250,000. Due to funding shortages, the new vehicle also does not have city and regional mapping capability.</p>
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<p>TriData Recommendation #49</p> <p>Rated Urgent by TriData</p> <p>Status: CLOSED</p> <p>12/5/05 Executive Response</p>	<p>The City of Seattle should consider creating its own Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC). This would allow the City to plan more efficiently for hazardous material incidents and would allow it to track the flow of information for chemicals; transportation flow studies; and create a Geographic Information System (GIS) that tracks the chemicals within the City on a daily basis.</p> <p>SFD implemented this recommendation.</p> <p>SFD established a Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC) for Seattle in 2004.</p> <p>Additional Information Collected by the Office of City Auditor</p> <p>SFD response: A Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC) representing local governments, emergency response officials, environmental and citizen groups, industry and other interested parties is established in each planning district. The LEPC is responsible for developing a local emergency plan for their district and for the collection of information submitted by industry which is made available to the public. The City of Seattle's LEPC is listed on the Washington State Department of Ecology's LEPC website:</p> <p>http://www.ecy.wa.gov/epcra/lepclist.html</p> <p>Office of City Auditor Note: Page 29 of the <u>City of Seattle ESF 10 – Hazardous Materials Emergency Resource Plan</u> states that Seattle's LEPC was established in 2002 to foster working relationships between the private sector and government agencies in addressing hazardous materials issues.</p>
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<p>TriData Recommendation #50</p> <p>The Fire Department should compare the State Department of Health hazardous materials reports to their own Fire Marshal's log to ensure that all of the information is being shared.</p> <p>This information can also be stored in a Geographic Information System (GIS) for further analysis.</p>	<p>Status: CLOSED</p> <p>SFD cannot implement this recommendation because in the State of Washington, the State Department of Health doesn't have responsibility for hazardous materials reports. However, SFD has implemented the intent of the recommendation in that they coordinate data on hazardous materials from several state and local sources.</p>	<p>12/5/05 Executive Response</p> <p>SFD Fire Marshal's Office Hazardous Materials Section is currently reviewing permit applications and other databases to capture all available hazardous materials information.</p>
		<p>Additional Information Collected by the Office of City Auditor</p> <p>SFD response: SFD is unaware of any State Department of Health hazardous materials reports.</p> <p>Some of the information regarding hazardous materials in the City is stored in CAMEO, a software program that SFD's Hazardous Materials Response Team (HazMat Team) uses in the field to retrieve hazard and response information pertaining to specific chemicals.</p> <p>The Fire Marshal's Office does not maintain direct contact with the State Department of Health for matters concerning hazardous materials. The Seattle Fire Code does not regulate infectious substances, select agents and toxins. Those aspects of biotech laboratories are regulated by the Seattle-King County Public Health Department and the federal government.</p> <p>In Washington State, the EPA hazardous materials rules, including hazardous chemical inventories, emergency response planning and hazardous/toxic chemical release reporting and notifications, have been adopted by the Department of Ecology and are enforced by that agency rather than the EPA.</p> <p>The SFD HazMat Unit uses the State Department of Health, Radiation Division, as a technical resource in the event of a radiological emergency.</p>

<p>TriData Recommendation #51</p> <p>An analysis should be done to determine if there are any unrecognized risks or risks for which the City has not adequately prepared related to hazardous material releases in the City. If so, the City may consider other measures for the control of the material. For example, Special Planning Zones (SPZ) may be created within a certain distance of hazardous materials sites. This would allow the City Fire Department and the planning department to approve or disapprove future hazardous materials sites within the City.</p>	<p>Status: CLOSED</p> <p>SFD has implemented the intent of this recommendation.</p> <p>Hazardous materials risks are identified through a combination of company level inspections by SFD Operations Division, inspections by Fire Marshals Office inspectors as part of the permitting process and voluntary reporting by facilities through the SARA Title III program. Mitigation of identified risks is accomplished through pre-planning by Emergency Management and the LEPC; engineering and administrative controls imposed through permitting; and emergency response training for Fire, Police, and other City departments.</p> <p>SFD response: The Fire Marshal's Office collects all of the information related to the storage handling and use of hazardous materials in the City (e.g., received from SFD's company level inspections, permit inspections and voluntary reporting). As stated in the 12/12/05 Executive Response, to mitigate identified hazardous materials risks, SFD relies upon a combination of engineering and/or administrative controls required as part of the permitting process, and pre-incident planning, training and equipment for emergency responders.</p> <p>The Seattle Fire Department Fire Prevention Inspection program policy and guidelines, which describe the process for documenting and reporting hazardous materials risks (i.e., those requiring an SFD permit), can be found in the Seattle Fire Department Policy & Operating Guidelines Manual; P-2000, Fire Prevention and OG-2000, Fire Prevention.</p> <p>While not entirely the same as the "Special Planning Zones", there is a defined area known as the "Downtown Fire District" where certain hazardous activities are tightly controlled and quantities of hazardous materials allowed are substantially reduced. The downtown fire district is the only special zone within the City of Seattle where hazardous activities are tightly controlled and quantities of hazardous materials allowed are substantially reduced.</p>

TriData Recommendation #52	The Fire Department should replace the technical rescue vehicle with a better-designed modern vehicle. The vehicle should be designed with more adequate space for the specialized equipment it is required to carry. The Department should consider the concept of support units and reserve trailers as a component of the overall operation and place them in various locations throughout the City.
Status: CLOSED	SFDF purchased a new, improved technical rescue vehicle.
12/5/05 Executive Response	The Technical Rescue vehicle is scheduled for replacement in late 2006 as the result of a cooperative agreement with Sound Transit.

SFDF response: A new Technical Rescue vehicle has been designed and ordered. Delivery of the new vehicle is scheduled for December 2006. The new vehicle contains adequate space for specialized equipment. Once the new technical rescue vehicle has gone into service, the old vehicle will be used as a back-up.

Office of City Auditor Note: A Fleets and Facilities Department official stated that the new technical rescue vehicle is substantially larger than the current vehicle. The new vehicle weighs nearly twice as much as the current vehicle and is longer.

<p>TriData Recommendation #53</p> <p>The Fire Department should gather together seasoned team members, determine technical rescue needs, seek outside expertise if necessary, and produce a manual to formalize technical rescue operations. There is a need to produce a team operations manual. It should include the team's mission, training levels and needs, response policies, and safety and operational guidelines and coordinate them with the overall City Emergency Operations Plan.</p>	<p>Status: CLOSED</p> <p>SFD has developed a manual that covers technical rescue operations.</p> <p>SFD is finalizing a Field Operations Guide for use department-wide which will contain a manual for Technical Rescue operations. SFD also has two members who sit on the National Fire Protection (NFPA) 1670 Technical Rescue Committee.</p> <p>SFD response: SFD's Technical Rescue Team manual has been created, but it is continually being updated. The City's Disaster Readiness and Response Plan states that SFD is the lead agency for the following types of incidents:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Major Fire • Hazardous Materials • Air Crash • Flood • Structure Collapse • Earthquake <p>SFD's Technical Rescue training and equipment is commensurate with these responsibilities.</p> <p>Office of City Auditor Note: During our meeting with SFD's Chief of Operations, we reviewed the SFD Technical Rescue Manual and the SFD Technical Rescue Guide.</p>
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<p>TriData Recommendation #54</p> <p>The Fire Department needs to develop a more sophisticated risk analysis program for Technical Rescue Operations. Other than the standard incident reporting system for the documentation of incidents, there is no information system in place by which to record and analyze the results of the technical rescue.</p>	<p>Status: CLOSED</p> <p>SFD is upgrading its risk management structure to the FEMA model and developing a standard reporting format and archive process. We see no barriers to the implementation of this recommendation.</p>	<p>12/5/05 Executive Response</p> <p>Additional Information Collected by the Office of City Auditor</p> <p>SFD response: SFD is upgrading its risk management structure to follow the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Risk Management model. The “FEMA Task Force Safety Officer” risk management model has the following goals:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Eliminate unnecessary risks, injuries and their severity • Reduce damage to materials, tools and property • Complete the mission activities effectively <p>SFD personnel are trained to conduct risk/benefit assessments upon arrival at an emergency site. The priority is life safety, both of victims and rescuers. SFD uses the following risk management process, based on the FEMA model, during emergencies:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Identify the hazards (e.g., does this involve a hazardous chemical release?). • Use a risk assessment matrix to attach a risk value to hazards and determine a strategy to address each risk (e.g., what is the quantity and strength of the chemicals released?). • A mitigation phase – we develop strategies to address each individual risk factor (e.g., SFD personnel should wear rubber suits for this incident). • A monitoring phase – to evaluate risk management strategies, make adjustments and start the risk management cycle again (e.g., has the chemical concentration decreased to a safe point? Are people becoming ill?). <p>SFD also complies with National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 1670 standards, which include field operations check sheets for each rescue discipline. NFPA standards require the presence of a Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment program.</p>
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	<p>While SFD currently does not have “lessons learned” requirements for all technical rescue responses, it is developing a standard reporting format and archive process.</p> <p>SFD conducts pre-fire and hazard surveys of all significant hazards within the city, and is updating its hazards assessment, but it lacks funding to adopt an electronic data format for its hazards database or risk management matrix.</p>
	<p>Office of City Auditor Note: During our August 29, 2006 meeting with SFD’s Assistant Chief of Operations, we reviewed the November 5, 2005 SFD document “Risk Assessment for Technical Rescue (FEMA Model)” that was obtained from the National Search and Rescue Response System Task Force Safety Officer Course.</p>

TriData Recommendation #55	Develop a comprehensive overall plan to formulate performance standards for the Technical Rescue entities. The standards need to be based on national standards, federal regulations and accepted practices. The plan should also establish methods and a time frame for structured appraisals.
Status: CLOSED	SFD implemented this recommendation.
12/5/05 Executive Response	<p>SFD is utilizing a knowledge, skills and abilities performance evaluation as a component of department-wide Rescue training. This model documents performance and gaps so tailored improvements can be made.</p> <p>SFD response: SFD has established performance standards for its Technical Rescue Team that comply with National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) standards. Specifically, the performance standards comply with NFPA 1006, which addresses performance standards for Technical Rescue entities, and NFPA 1670, which addresses general rescue requirements at the Awareness, Operational, and Technician Levels. SFD's course curriculum and evaluations for its Technical Rescue personnel include criteria directly connected to NFPA 1006.</p> <p>SFD conducts, at a minimum, annual structured appraisals of its Technical Rescue personnel. Some evaluation requirements for Rescue Technicians are semi-annual or more frequent (e.g., dive, confined space).</p> <p>Office of City Auditor Note: During our August 29, 2006 meeting with SFD's Assistant Chief of Operations, we reviewed NFPA 1006 and 1670.</p>

TriData Recommendation #56	The Dive Team should continue to pursue replacement of its aged and outdated equipment and apparatus.	
Status: CLOSED	SFD implemented this recommendation.	
12/5/05 Executive Response	SFD Dive Team has received upgraded equipment through federal grants and department investments. This totals over \$90,000 in upgrades.	
Additional Information Collected by the Office of City Auditor	<p>SFD response: With the \$90,000 in federal grants and department funds, the SFD Dive Team acquired the following new equipment:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dry suits • Full Facemasks • Regulators – MK25 • Twin Jet Fins • OTS SSB Transceivers • Buoyancy Compensators • Steel Tanks 100 cf • Steel Tanks 100 cf • Pony Bottles • Neoprene Gloves – 5mm • Neoprene Gloves – 3 mm • Dive Boots • Search Lines with Snap • Search Reels • Dive Knives • Weight Belts • Gear Bags • Pony Bottle Bracelets • Lift Bags • Underwater Camera • Digital Underwater Timer • Dive Lights • Portable Wireless Surface Intercom • Life Vests 	

	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Rescue Harness• Hydraulic Tools <p>SFD's Assistant Chief of Operations stated that SFD would have had to spend \$200,000 (versus \$90,000) to provide each member of the SFD Dive Team with a full set of personalized equipment.</p>
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<p>TriData Recommendation #57</p> <p>The City should choose a standard incident management system for all utilities, implement it, and train with it. The most successful municipalities use incident management to deal with every incident, response, or event, planned or otherwise. All personnel, starting with senior leadership, should be trained in its use and operation. The effectiveness of incident management systems is significantly increased when employed regularly.</p>	<p>Status: CLOSED</p> <p>SPU and SCL have implemented this recommendation.</p>
<p>12/5/05 Executive Response</p>	<p>SPU is a practitioner of the Incident Command System and invests training time and effort in providing ICS level training to its employees. In addition, SPU has devoted significant staffing time and resources to ensure that we are NIMS compliant. As of 30 November, 2005 approximately 390 SPU employees had completed and passed NIMS 700 certification. Additional ICS training opportunities that SPU avails itself of are: ICS100-400 series, ICS-800, EMS professional series for Emergency Management Specific personnel, Debris MGT series and other training as available.</p>
<p>Additional Information Collected by the Office of City Auditor</p> <p>SPU response: SPU, in conjunction with other city departments, has adopted National Incident Management System (NIMS) as its emergency management system and will continue training appropriate personnel in Incident Command System (ICS) training as required by federal guidelines. Additional levels of training are federally required during this and future federal fiscal years. SPU is continuing to train and implement forthcoming requirements.</p> <p>SCL response:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • As of October 19, 2006, 215 SCL staff members had completed the ICS 700 course, 122 had completed the IS 100 course, and 109 had completed the IS 200 course. • SCL became NIMS compliant by September 30, 2006. • All identified staff in supervisory and managerial positions completed NIMS training for the IS 700, IS 100, and IS 200 by September 30, 2006. Additional managers and supervisors are in the process of completing NIMS training by December 30, 2006. • SCL is also scheduling staff members to complete the “Train the Trainer” NIMS course in order to have in house instructors for employees needing training in the future. <p>Office of City Auditor Note: We reviewed SCL’s training plan, and an Office of Emergency Management report on NIMS training by department that indicated SCL employees were obtaining the training.</p>	

TriData Recommendation #58 Status: CLOSED 12/5/05 Executive Response	<p>All City utilities should participate in or emulate the SPU family and outreach training program. The SPU program is well conceived and appears to be sufficiently flexible to be modified by other agencies for use without significant resource commitment. This training should include personal and family protective actions, threats, and response procedures.</p> <p>SPU will be expanding its training program for staff and families in 2006. SPU employees are also issued 72-hour kits. Additionally, the Office of Emergency Management will be providing training to all City employees in all departments on personal and family preparedness in 2006.</p> <p>SPD response: The City is in the process of providing emergency preparedness training to all City employees, via both meeting and (soon) web-based format. The goal is to have this completed by the end of 2006.</p>	<p>SCL response:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Emergency Preparedness Training sessions are scheduled for all SCL employees throughout the year. • Individual Disaster Kits will be purchased for each SCL employee and to be distributed in conjunction with the Individual Preparedness training. • Disaster Readiness Kits in the workplace have been provided to SCL facilities. Supplies are surveyed annually and expired items replaced as required. • SCL's Continuity of Operations Plan has been completed and submitted to the City's Office of Emergency Management. <p>Office of City Auditor Note: We reviewed a copy of SCL's training plan, and noted that a July 17, 2006 article on SCL's InWeb site contained an article that described the emergency preparedness training being provided to SCL employees.</p>
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TriData Recommendation #64	<p>City Light should install concrete barriers at all public utility entrance gates that are not used daily, to prevent vehicular attacks. Additionally, fences, gates, and concrete barrier walls should be topped with razor wire, barbed wire, or combinations of these materials to prevent unauthorized access. Several of the key control and operations facilities have good perimeter and intrusion alarms linked. A comprehensive review of these systems should be undertaken to upgrade or replace these systems.</p>
Status: CLOSED	<p>SCL is in the process of fully implementing this recommendation. We see no barriers to its completion.</p> <p>See answer to #63. Also, SPU is working with SCL at Cedar River to enact a barrier plan to protect the Watershed area and joint SPU/SCL operated facilities.</p> <p>SCL response: Improvements to some of SCL's facilities have been completed and others are in the process of being completed:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The 2003 CH2M Hill facility vulnerability assessment's recommendations concerning adding concrete barriers have been addressed. Other facilities where bollards (i.e., a series of posts preventing vehicles from entering an area) should be installed will be completed by December 2006. • By 2010, SCL will install intrusion detection systems that detect, delay and deter unauthorized intrusions in and around critical facilities. These include lighting, motion detectors, surveillance cameras, and alarm systems on existing structures. • Security systems will be monitored at SCL's Central Security Monitoring Center that will become operational in December 2006 and be staffed on a 24/7 basis with established procedures for response. • Razor wire will be installed at all SCL facilities, and fences may be replaced or will be enhanced with concertina type razor wire, barbed wire, or combinations of these materials. Gates may be replaced and/or upgraded with better lock systems. • Design considerations will be given to fencing and gates with capability to withstand impact of moving objects. • SCL is also assessing ways to restrict parking, reduce access near and around critical sites, look at ways to install more attractive barriers at critical sites, and increase patrols by Seattle Police Department or security staff.
12/5/05 Executive Response	
Additional Information Collected by the Office of City Auditor	

	<p>SCL's existing perimeter and intrusion alarm systems were evaluated as part of vulnerability assessments conducted in 2004 and 2005. As each site is improved, systems now in place will be upgraded to meet current City standards.</p> <p>Office of City Auditor Note: We reviewed the CH2M Hill Study and the resulting SCL capital improvement plan that listed the prioritized improvements that would be made on SCL critical facilities. SCL's Security and Emergency Preparedness Director stated that SCL based its facilities improvement plan on the CH2M Hill study's recommendations.</p>
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TriData Recommendation #65	<p>Telephone numbers at critical sites and remote facilities should have the telephone numbers blocked at the telephone switch or should have the main utility switchboard number displayed.</p> <p>The installation of caller identification equipment would allow further investigation of these types of incidents.</p>
Status: CLOSED	SCL has implemented this recommendation.
12/5/05 Executive Response	<p>This activity is in place at many of SPU's critical sites. The activity name is displayed but not the number itself.</p>
Additional Information Collected by the Office of City Auditor	<p>SCL response: Telephone numbers at all SCL sites are blocked by the City of Seattle telephone systems if the calling party is calling from a phone outside of the City's phone system.</p>

TriData Recommendation #66	City Light should follow the example of SPU and appoint an executive-level person to serve as Chief Security or Chief Preparedness Officer. Key to the success of such positions has been the authority to coordinate security and emergency preparedness.
Status: CLOSED	SCL has implemented this recommendation.
12/5/05 Executive Response	City Light is in the final stages of hiring a permanent executive level security and emergency preparedness manager and currently has an interim person in that position.
Additional Information Collected by the Office of City Auditor	SCL response: On January 25, 2006, SCL hired a permanent Security and Emergency Preparedness Director. This individual is leading work to implement capital projects in SCL's strategic plan for security improvements and business continuity. In addition, this individual is responsible for establishing a comprehensive and integrated security program, and access management policies and procedures for the department.

Office of City Auditor Note: We met with SCL's Security and Emergency Preparedness Director.

TriData Recommendation #67	Seattle information technology personnel should explore methods to further secure system operating consoles, to make it harder for untrained and unauthorized persons to tamper with system operations.
Status: CLOSED	SPU and SCL have explored and implemented methods to improve security over operating consoles.
12/5/05 Executive Response	SPU SCADA has taken steps to reduce the threat by installing alarms and tamper warning systems at many of its upgraded facilities.
Additional Information Collected by the Office of City Auditor	<p>SPU response: SPU used data from the vulnerability assessment conducted by Sandia National Laboratories to determine which sites facilities were higher risk and warranted these security measures.</p> <p>Office of City Auditor Note: We visited a SPU facility and verified the presence of security measures to secure system operating controls.</p> <p>SCL response: SCL will have 24 hour/7 days a week guard service to staff the SCL Security Monitoring Center starting in January 2007. At other critical command and control sites (e.g., substations, powerhouses, dams, and communication sites, server rooms, etc.), SCL is reducing the threat by installing new intrusion systems and cameras and upgrading existing systems that will be monitored by the new Security Monitoring Center. SCL also employs safeguards such as firewalls, intrusion and prevention detection to protect its critical systems and encryption to prevent unauthorized access to data traffic transmission.</p> <p>SCL is developing its implementation plan for compliance with the requirements of the North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) Cyber Security Standards (CIP 002-009). SCL plans to be substantially compliant with the NERC Cyber Security Standards by March 31, 2009.</p> <p>Office of City Auditor Note: SCL's Security and Emergency Preparedness Director stated that SCL will enhance physical security at its critical facilities by following the CH2M Hill study's recommendations.</p>

TriData Recommendation #68	All top-level public information officers who have not taken the Emergency Management Institute Course “E388 Advanced Public Information Officers” should do so as soon as possible. At a minimum, obtain the course materials if possible.
Status: CLOSED	The intent of the recommendation has been implemented.
12/5/05 Executive Response	<p>All top level Public Information Officers take part in relevant training and participate in all City-sponsored drills and exercises to practice that training</p> <p>Response from SPU’s Public Information Officer, the City’s principal public information officer for City-wide emergency management: About 70 percent of the City’s first line public information officers (PIOs) have taken the Emergency Management Institute’s E388 course. Those City first-line PIOs who have not taken the course have acquired the skills taught in the course through participation in actual emergency events and drills. The actual events include WTO, Y2K, and the Nisqually earthquake. The drills included the TOPOFF2 exercise. The lessons learned during the actual events and drills were more useful to PIOs than the course.</p> <p>The City does not currently offer a course equivalent to the E388 course, but it offers emergency-preparedness training for all City employees.</p>

TriData Recommendation #69	The City should host an in-depth, detailed seminar for members of the media in the near future to prepare them to cover an emergency in Seattle. This will help them do their jobs and help get information to the public when needed.
Status: CLOSED	The recommendation has been implemented.
12/5/05 Executive Response	Members of the media are invited to many of the City's drills and exercises specifically so that they can learn what the City's response will be in emergencies. Examples recently include TOPOFF 2, the Marine Terrorism Exercise, and the Alaskan Way Viaduct Field Exercise.
Additional Information Collected by the Office of Auditor	<p>Response from SPU's Public Information Officer, the City's principal public information officer for City-wide emergency management: Media were invited by the City to cover exercises such as the TOPOFF 2 and the Alaskan Way Viaduct Field Exercise. They were also part of the recent Blue Cascade two-day exercise in Bellevue which concerned how to cope with a major earthquake. Furthermore, in October 2006, the City of Seattle co-hosted the Department of Homeland Security/Radio and News Director Foundation workshop, which was a day-long event on how the media and government should interact during a major emergency. This was a regional event involving Seattle and King County government and media officials.</p>

TriData Recommendation #70	The Mayor and the Director of Communications should be the sole voices for the City government during an emergency. All Public Information Officers should provide information to the PIO Team to ensure that information provided is thorough and accurate.
Status: CLOSED	The intent of this recommendation has been implemented.
12/5/05 Executive Response	More important than “sole voice” is the importance and credibility achieved with the public by the “one message” concept of emergency public information. This practice is identified in the City’s Disaster Readiness and Response Plan and is practiced in training and exercises.
Additional Information Collected by the Office of Auditor	<p>Response from SPU’s Public Information Officer, the City’s principal public information officer for City-wide emergency management: The single message concept guides the City’s public communications during emergencies. When the City’s Emergency Operations Center (EOC) is activated, the standard operating procedure is for departments to cease issuing public information announcements and instead funnel everything through the EOC. The use of this procedure was the result of the City’s bad experience with the November 1999 WTO event. The City used the single message approach to handle Y2K, the Nisqually earthquake, and during the TOPOFF2 exercise.</p> <p>Office of City Auditor Note: Also page 74/Adobe page 88 (Exhibit 32) in the City’s Disaster Readiness and Response Plan shows that public information during an emergency will be channeled through the PIO team and Mayor.</p>

TriData Recommendation #71 Status: Closed 12/5/05 Executive Response	<p>All front-line employees should receive some level of training on how to react and respond to inquiries during an emergency. No front-line employees, including receptionists, first responders, or department staff members, should be speaking with the media in an emergency beyond directing the calls to the Communications office.</p> <p>The intent of this recommendation has been implemented.</p>
<p>Additional Information Collected by the Office of Auditor</p> <p>SPU response: The City's principal public information officer (PIO) for City-wide emergency management stated that the single message concept guides the City's public communications during emergencies. When the City's Emergency Operations Center (EOC) is activated, the standard operating procedure is for departments to cease issuing public information announcements and instead funnel everything through the EOC. The use of this procedure was the result of the City's experience with the November 1999 WTO event. The City used the single message approach to handle Y2K, the Nisqually earthquake, and during the TOPOFF2 exercise.</p> <p>Office of City Auditor Note: We interviewed three key first responder agencies (SPD, Fire, and SPU) and found that all have policies in place regarding public communications during an emergency. The specific policies of each department are described below.</p> <p>SPD response: SPD policies and procedures governing media relations are found in the SPD Policies and Procedures Manual, Section 1.065, Administrative Section, Media Relations (see http://www.seattle.gov/Publications/default.htm for a copy of the Seattle Police Department's Operations Manual). The policy is that no one under the rank of Lieutenant can talk to the media. Access to the media is tightly controlled, and SPD officers are trained in the policies and procedures governing media relations during their initial training and thereafter during Roll Calls.</p> <p>SPD officers <u>are</u> allowed to talk to members of the public; however, there are a number of different ways SPD management gets information out to officers quickly during emergencies to ensure the public receives consistent information. First, all command staff are connected to a paging system and can be paged at any time by request of the Chief of Police. Command staff, in turn, have three different venues available to them to get information out to officers: 1) announcements during Roll</p>	

	<p>Call, 2) e-mail (Groupwise), and/or 3) the Mobile Data Computers (MDCs) found in every patrol car.</p> <p>SFD response: Our front-line employees have been trained in how to deal with public inquiries during an emergency, including: 1) screening them for personal emergencies (in which case the caller is directed to call 911); 2) reading a prepared statement; or 3) directing them to the department's PIO.</p> <p>SPU response: All public inquiries related to utilities during emergencies would be directed to the Call Center. Call Center representatives are prepared to respond to a variety of emergencies, and are prepared to staff the center on a 24 hour basis if necessary. Typically, during emergencies, Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) specific to the situation are developed by communications and management staff for use by the Call Center. Media calls are directed to the primary communications representative for the particular emergency or situation.</p>
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TriData Recommendation #74 Status: CLOSED	<p>To further enhance Seattle's radio communications interoperability capabilities, the City should explore the use of devices that allow patching of different radio systems. The ACU 1000 should be considered.</p>
12/5/05 Executive Response	<p>The City has obtained devices that allow patching of different radio systems.</p> <p>The City has procured, with UASI grants a Police Communications vehicle with an “Infinimode” switch. The DoIT radio shop has programmed this switch to allow interoperability between a number of radio networks, including King County/Seattle 800 MHz radio, WSDOT, Seattle Transportation, and Washington State Patrol. This vehicle was deployed in November, 2005.</p> <p>The City has built, using UASI grants, a permanent interoperable link between the King County/Seattle, Port of Seattle, Snohomish County and Tacoma/Pierce County radio networks. This interconnect has been successfully constructed and an operating procedure for dispatch centers has been created.</p> <p>DOIT response: The permanent interoperable link between the Puget Sound jurisdictions is called the Tri-County Radio Interoperability System (TRIS). A protocol has been established for TRIS operation, by SPD’s emergency preparedness bureau, and the system has been tested. The operation of TRIS does not depend upon the Police Communications vehicle. TRIS operation is accomplished via equipment at radio sites – no special vehicle or handheld radios are required. All police and fire agencies in King County can, with the basic 800 MHz trunked system, interoperate without either TRIS or the vehicle.</p> <p>The ACU 1000 is used on a regional basis; however, we elected to use Infinimode G5 in the City because it has similar capabilities in a smaller footprint and is less expensive.</p> <p>Office City Auditor Note: we visited the SPD Communications Vehicle and viewed the “Infinimode” switch, purchased with Federal UASI funds, which is located in the vehicle. This switch allows different communications devices from different jurisdictions to communicate with one another (e.g., a Pierce County 800 MHz radio to communicate with a City of Seattle cell phone). According to the SPD officer who accompanied us on our visit, the switch would only be used in an emergency if other communication system would not function properly (i.e., it is a redundant system).</p>

TriData Recommendation #77	<p>The Emergency Management Bureau should develop a list of public safety departments and agencies in the metro Seattle region currently using NEXTEL phones, and then share Direct Connect® calling numbers among key personnel, regardless of other interoperability capabilities.</p>
Status: CLOSED	<p>The City has not been able to fully implement this recommendation because of the administrative burden it would entail to create and maintain a database of the numbers of non-City public safety departments and agencies.</p>
12/5/05 Executive Response	<p>Starting in March, 2005, the City has acquired and is deploying Nextel BlackBerry devices. These devices not only have direct-connect capability, but also device-to-device text messaging via a PIN, and links to the City's internal e-mail system. A database of direct-connect and PIN numbers (as well as the employee name and regular cell phone number) is maintained by DoIT and shared with key emergency response staff such as the Mayor. SPD Emergency Preparedness Bureau is also building a regional satellite phone directory.</p>
Additional Information Collected by the Office of City Auditor	<p>DOIT response: We continue deployment of both blackberries and satellite phones. In June, 2006, for example, satellite telephone sets were deployed to every Seattle Fire station. The database of direct-connect and PIN numbers does not contain numbers of non-City public safety departments because there is no practical way to create, populate and maintain a database of this kind. This has proved challenging even within the City for phones we manage ourselves. Each individual carrying such a phone will add their own contact phone numbers to their phone. We've not yet found a way to interleave a master database of direct-connect and PIN's with the numbers uniquely added to each individual phone.</p> <p>Office of City Auditor Note: Nextel's Direct Connect phone service allows you to push a single button and connect with another Nextel user. Also, you can specify a group of Nextel users (up to 100) that you can connect to all at once, similar to a dispatcher's radio used by police or taxi companies.</p> <p>According to SPD's Emergency Preparedness Bureau, they have completed the regional satellite phone directory, which includes government entities from King, Pierce and Snohomish counties, the Port of Seattle, and the State of Washington.</p>

TriData Recommendation #78	Frequent drills should be conducted to ensure familiarity with existing interoperability capabilities and procedures and to identify improvements needed in advance of an actual event or disaster.
Status: CLOSED	The City participates in drills that test communications interoperability.
12/5/05 Executive Response	<p>There are two major levels of radio interoperability currently in place for first responders in the urban area. The first level is the King County Public Safety Radio network, which is used by all police and fire agencies in King County, as well many other agencies such as Seattle Public Utilities. The Police 911 Center and Fire Alarm Center work with this interoperability on a daily basis, cross-connecting talk groups to deal with mutual aid, cross-jurisdictional coordination at incident scenes and the daily work of dealing with emergency response. Once every month - on the second Wednesday - the entire region - all public safety answering points - participate in a "zone controller switch" which tests the technical integrity of the countywide radio network. The second level of interoperability was established this year - an interconnect between local agencies and the federal Integrated Wireless Network used by the FBI, Secret Service, FEMA and related agencies. The local agencies involved include King County, the Snohomish Emergency Radio System (SERS), Tacoma/Pierce County, the Port of Seattle, and the Washington State Patrol. This interoperability has been tested twice in 2005 and is now operational. An operating procedures manual is the final stage of development by the PSAPs (Public Safety Answering Points) who will use this function.</p>

Office of City Auditor Note: We interviewed the DOIT staffer who oversees the "zone controller switch" drills. He explained that these drills have been conducted for many years, and are done monthly. The zone controller is a computer and associated electronic equipment that facilitates radio communications between different government entities.

We also interviewed a Seattle Police Department official about the Tri-County Radio Interoperability System (TRIS). TRIS is the permanent interoperable radio link between the Puget Sound jurisdictions. He said that beginning in May 2006, TRIS has been tested monthly to ensure that Seattle, King County, the Port of Seattle, and Valley Communications Center (an inter-local agency composed of the cities of Auburn, Kent, Renton, Tukwila and Federal Way) can communicate with one another. Another SPD officer told us that Valley Communication has authored TRIS user documentation (e.g., what frequencies are available and who will use them). According to the City's Director of Emergency Management, a homeland security Tactical Interoperable Exercise involving TRIS partners was conducted in September 2006.

TriData Recommendation #79	The City of Seattle should continue to fund and maintain the City's private fiber optic telephone network and test it regularly to insure that it is available as a backup in the event of a communications failure.
Status: CLOSED	The City funds and maintains a fiber optic network.
12/5/05 Executive Response	The City, via DoIT, continues to build out fiber optic cable networks. The DoIT CIP budget for this was 1,613,000 (actual) in 2004 and 2,500,000 in 2005. Under various programs including UASI grants, every police precinct and all fire stations (except one) and most other major City facilities have been connected by fiber optic cable. DoIT is leading a project to connect every elementary school with fiber optic cable (using school funds) over the next three years.
Additional Information Collected by the Office of City Auditor	<p>DOIT response: The City's fiber optic telephone network is used daily – almost all telephone calls internal to City government traverse this network.</p> <p>The project to connect every elementary school with fiber optic cable is in the first phase. The Seattle School district has placed this project on deployment hiatus until school closings have been determined.</p> <p>Fire Stations #40 (Wedgewood) and #41 (Magnolia) have not been connected to fiber optic cable due to the cost of routing to such a remote location, more than one mile from the nearest fiber cable. The cost versus benefit was not practical. Fire crews are not always in the Station and in an emergency, once fire fighters have been dispatched, the primary mode of communications is radio. Fiber provides no support during these times. However, with the planned Seattle Public Schools fiber project, they will be connected in the next two years.</p>

TriData Recommendation #80	The City of Seattle should promote a greater recognition of the need for IT security, risk management, and threat mitigation programs.
Status: CLOSED	The City has promoted increased awareness of information technology (IT) security issues.
12/5/05 Executive Response	The City has allocated significant resource to this function. DoIT has hired a Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) and a deputy. An extensive set of policies and procedures to secure information and the infrastructure, including a comprehensive Information Security Policy have been developed and implemented. The City via DoIT funded \$223,000 (2004) and \$1,832,000 (2005) in infrastructure security enhancements. In 2006 DoIT has a funded plan to completely upgrade the City's Internet connection for public-facing web applications and a funded plan to begin implementing secure Wi-Fi for City government internal wireless use.
Additional Information Collected by the Office of City Auditor	Office of City Auditor Note: Because we have worked during the past three years with the CISO's office on various information technology security projects and have attended meetings of the City's Information Technology Security Board, we can confirm the validity of the Executive's response.

TriData Recommendation #82	Because of the special security needs in law enforcement and public safety, the CISO should identify and directly supervise an individual responsible for overseeing IT security, risk management, and threat mitigation of these “stand-alone” systems.
Status: CLOSED	This recommendation will not be implemented because the CISO does not directly supervise the SPD personnel responsible for overseeing IT security, risk management, and threat mitigation of SPD's systems, although SPD coordinates its information technology security work with DOIT.
12/5/05 Executive Response	A team of two individuals and a manager oversee network security in the Seattle Police Department. This staff does not directly report to the CISO, but closely coordinates work with the CISO. An additional team of six individuals from DoIT, SCL and SPU manage and oversee infrastructure network security in those departments and throughout the remainder of City government.
Additional Information Collected by the Office of City Auditor	DOIT response: DoIT has not requested formal appointments for this purpose from departments, but most departments have designated an individual to serve on the City's Information Technology Security Board (ITSB).

Office of City Auditor Note: The Chief Information Security Officer (CISO), who works within DOIT, confirmed that the Seattle Police Department (SPD) has three individuals who oversee SPD's network security, and that SPD coordinates its information technology security activities with DOIT.

TriData Recommendation #83	The City should consider hiring or retaining an attorney with expertise in information technology and liability issues to assist in IT security and compliance planning.
Status: CLOSED	The intent of this recommendation has been met with current City legal resources.
12/5/05 Executive Response	<p>The City's law department has several attorneys to advise and support DoIT and other departments with IT security and compliance planning. Engel Lee, for example, is presently working with DoIT and SPD staff on digital certificates for Public Key Infrastructure. Gary Keese has advised DoIT on acceptable use policies.</p> <p>Additional Information Collected by the Office of City Auditor</p> <p>Office of City Auditor Note: According to the City's Law Department and the City's Chief Information Security Officer, the City has adequate legal expertise on information technology (IT) issues to meet its current needs. As noted by the CISO, this is largely due to the fact that the City is not currently required to comply with most of the IT security regulatory standards that are typical of private sector entities (e.g., the Gramm-Leach Bliley Act, HIPAA, Sarbanes-Oxley Act). For certain functions, such as the modification of contract language to better protect the City from liability stemming from unauthorized disclosure of information, DoIT has an effective attorney who is assigned half-time to the Office of Information Security.</p>

<p>TriData Recommendation #84</p> <p>Status: CLOSED</p> <p>12/5/05 Executive Response</p> <p>Additional Information Collected by the Office of City Auditor</p>	<p>The City should improve access to key public safety networks by authorized individuals physically located in the EOC and other locations where emergency management tasks are performed. It should also explore the feasibility of providing or enhancing secure remote access for use when these facilities are inoperable or inaccessible.</p> <p>Status: CLOSED</p> <p>The current EOC and new EOC provide improved access to key public safety networks.</p> <p>Using UASI funds, the data network in the present EOC has been completely rebuilt to current standards. Certain workstations in the EOC are now set up for access to public safety networks through the firewall, which protects Police networks from general City government. Further improvements are planned for the new EOC, which is presently in the design phase.</p> <p>DOIT response: To provide and enhance secure remote access when the City's Emergency Operating Center (EOC) and other emergency management locations are inoperable or inaccessible, DoIT has implemented certain remote tools such as Groupwise Web and a Citrix/Metaframe server. SPU and SCL operate their own Citrix/Metaframe servers. Many key responders in multiple departments now have been issued laptop computers.</p> <p>Office of City Auditor Note: We visited the EOC and learned that since the TriData report was issued in 2003, three EOC workstations have been connected to Seattle Police Department servers (i.e., "key public safety networks"). We also learned that about \$200,000 of federal UASI funds were used to place the data network wiring in a secure place (i.e., no exposed wiring).</p>
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TriData Recommendation #85 Status: CLOSED	<p>The City should examine the lack of interoperability between the City EOC and agency EOCS, and facilitate discussions about how this can be improved. Representatives from all departments with these facilities should be involved in these discussions.</p>
12/5/05 Executive Response	<p>The City has taken steps to improve interoperability between the EOC and department operations and dispatch centers (e.g., purchasing the WebEOC product, and use of the All-City intercom system).</p> <p>Using UASI funds, the City has purchased and installed the WebEOC incident-management product with a GIS interface in the Seattle EOC and the Seattle Police Operating Center. The same funding source purchased the WebEOC product for use in Snohomish, Pierce and King County EOCS. Operations staff in the various City department operating centers have been trained in the use of WebEOC, and all such operating centers are networked together with the City's EOC. But more extensive training and drills need to be conducted in the use of this product to actually manage incidents.</p> <p>DOIT response: Please contact the SPD Office of Emergency Management regarding interagency drills. SPD-OEM has conducted both drills and training sessions with WebEOC involving City departments.</p> <p>Technically, there is only one City EOC, while certain departments maintain operations and dispatch centers that are operating 24 hours a day/7 days a week. The Seattle Police Department has SPOT (the Seattle Police Operation Center), the Seattle Fire Department has RMC (Resource Management Center) and the Seattle Department of Transportation, Seattle City Light, and Seattle Public Utilities have dispatch centers. Currently, using the All-City intercom system, they are able to push one button to conference between one or more centers. The planned Audio/Visual system at the new EOC, located at Fire Station #10, will enhance this interoperability. SPD offers training in the use of WebEOC to City department personnel the first Wednesday of each month and serves on a regional group which is designing the use of regional boards (or screens) for information. To date, the regional group includes the City of Seattle and the Washington State Military Department's Emergency Management Division. The group is currently working on technical issues related to data sharing. Once these are resolved, which should occur this year, the group will be expanded.</p> <p>Office of City Auditor Note: During our 8/23/06 tour of the EOC, we viewed the WebEOC software installed on one of the EOC workstations.</p>

<p>TriData Recommendation #86</p> <p>The Department of Information Technology should perform a detailed review of the equipment and software in the EOC and update or replace outdated items, where necessary. Special consideration should be given to areas where emergency management software (versus general office software) would enhance functionality.</p>	<p>Status: CLOSED</p> <p>The current EOC has and the new EOC will have updated equipment and software.</p> <p>DoIT has assumed management of the servers, desktop computers and software in the Seattle EOC, under a written service level agreement between the two agencies. Software and some hardware (data communications) have been upgraded, and further upgrades are planned when the new EOC is constructed.</p> <p>Office of City Auditor Note: We visited the City's current Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and noted that many hardware and software upgrades had been made there since the TriData report was published in 2003. The upgrades include three workstations with access to SPD servers, secure phones, an additional satellite phone, radio patching equipment, installation of WebEOC software on EOC workstations, formerly exposed wiring has been covered, broadcasting equipment has been added, and a closed video conferencing network installed to connect Seattle with the Governor, three counties (King, Pierce and Snohomish), Bellevue, and other EOCs.</p> <p>The new EOC, currently being constructed, will contain additional improvements, including increased space.</p>

TriData Recommendation	The Emergency Medical Services Division of PHSKC should work toward making the agency's Red Book accessible to on- and off-site employees via the Internet.
Status: CLOSED	The intent of the recommendation has been implemented. The Red Book is available to all employees through multiple venues.
12/5/05 Executive Response	The Preparedness Section is responsible for development and dissemination of the Department's Emergency Operations Plan. The Plan is now available on the Department's Intranet website.
Additional Information Collected by the Office of Auditor	<p>Public Health Seattle King County (PHSKC) response: The plan is on the department's Intranet http://publichealth/policy/emergency/index.htm and on public folders. We are in the process of updating the plan.</p> <p>The plan is not available to employees off-site via the Internet, but is accessible in hard copy at all Public Health sites and electronically to all employees through public folders. We have not wanted to provide the plan to the general public; the plan is for Public Health staff and response partners. We may consider Internet posting during the current updating process.</p>

TriData Recommendation #88	Cross-reference supplementary information in the public health emergency operations plan (sections 5–10) with tasks in operations checklists (section 4). This would create a “one-stop” document for each department.
Status: CLOSED	The intent of the recommendation has been implemented. The Emergency Operations Plan and Emergency Operations Center Procedural Manual have been completely rewritten and the Manual is based on the plan.
12/5/05 Executive Response	The Plan has been completely revised with a newly developed Emergency Operations Center Procedures Guide incorporated by reference.
Additional Information Collected by the Office of Auditor	PHSKC response: The Emergency Operations Center Procedures Guide is available to all Public Health responders electronically and in hard copy at all response centers. The Emergency Operations Plan and Emergency Operations Center Procedural Manual have been completely rewritten. The Manual is based on the plan.

TriData Recommendation #89	The City of Seattle should work with Harborview Medical Center to better integrate its public health agencies into the web-based hospital network created to share information regarding resource availability, patient status, and disease tracking.
Status: CLOSED	Systems are in place to ensure that data on resource availability, patient status and disease tracking is collected and shared on a region wide basis.
12/5/05 Executive Response	<p>PHSKC has been fully integrated into a web-based data sharing system, managed by Harborview Medical Center, that tracks in real-time hospital status and resources.</p> <p>PHSKC response: The web-based data sharing system is overseen by the Regional Emergency Preparedness Group (REPG), a local group that includes representatives from 19 hospitals. It is chaired by Public Health. It is a real-time, web-based, password protected system of sharing information about hospital capacity, including, for example, beds available by type of bed (ICU beds, etc.), ventilators, key drugs, etc. Deciding what information should be shared on the system is in an evolving process, and is a topic that is discussed by the REP古 on a regular basis.</p> <p>The Washington State Department of Health's Comprehensive Hospital Abstract Reporting System (CHARS) is the database used to prepare the annual summary of disease incidents; however, it is not relevant to emergency management. For real-time information on disease outbreaks, PHSKC relies on information gathered by its Communicable Disease Epidemiology Section.</p> <p>Regional Emergency Preparedness Group response: REP古 manages the web-based hospital network, which is funded through Region 6 and state Health Resources and Services Administration dollars.</p>

TriData Recommendation #96	The City of Seattle should work with PHSKC and other local, State, and federal agencies to create and implement a real-time syndromic surveillance system for the region. Current web-based reporting systems used in local hospitals should be integrated into this system where possible.
Status: CLOSED	King County has a real time syndromic surveillance system in place.
12/5/05 Executive Response	Public Health has implemented syndromic surveillance in King County as part of a comprehensive surveillance and disease investigation program.
Additional Information Collected by the Office of Auditor	<p>PHSKC response: For real-time information on disease outbreaks, PHSKC relies on information gathered by its Communicable Disease Epidemiology Section. The Washington State Department of Health's Comprehensive Hospital Abstract Reporting System (CHARS) is the database used to prepare the annual summary of disease incidents; however, it is not relevant to emergency management.</p> <p>Regional Emergency Preparedness Group response: In addition to using the CHARS database to prepare an annual summary of disease incidents, the Seattle/King County region has an on-going syndromic surveillance system in place. It is managed by Atar Bayer in the Communicable Disease Epidemiology Section of PHSKC. To create the syndromic surveillance system, each hospital worked with PHSKC to provide a link with their registration data. Data from patients' in-take forms is downloaded directly onto the County's system, including information about specific symptoms.</p>

TriData Recommendation #97 Rated Urgent by TriData	<p>The City of Seattle should ensure that all hospitals and other facilities that might need to serve as decontamination areas are able to perform this function. Routine drills should be encouraged. The City should provide Fire Department and EMS coverage to coordinate with health care facilities for these events. Equipment must be maintained and tested regularly.</p>
Status: CLOSED	<p>According to both PHSKC and the Regional Emergency Preparedness Group, all hospitals in this region have decontamination equipment on site. The Regional Emergency Preparedness Group stated that all hospitals have conducted drills with the equipment.</p>
12/5/05 Executive Response	<p>Public Health has coordinated the identification and acquisition of decontamination equipment for all Seattle hospitals. This item is complete. However, the City of Seattle can't regulate what hospitals should have. JACHO, the accrediting agency for hospitals, does this.</p>
Additional Information Collected by the Office of Auditor	<p>PHSKC response: The acquisition and storage of decontamination equipment is complete because it was coordinated through the Regional Emergency Preparedness Group.</p>

Regional Emergency Preparedness Group response: All hospitals in this region have decontamination equipment on site. It is the same equipment at all hospitals, and personnel at all the hospitals have performed drills using it. The equipment was funded by federal grants from the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), so it came with certain stipulations and requirements. All of these stipulations and requirements have been fulfilled.

<p>TriData Recommendation #100</p> <p>12/5/05 Executive Response</p>	<p>Draft legislation that would protect the security of any plan or provision that would compromise the security of the City. The details of the plan should not be accessible to the public. At the point where the barriers are State laws or judicial rulings, the Office of Government Relations and the City Attorney should meet with State legislators to address the concerns.</p> <p>Status: CLOSED</p> <p>The City Council decided that this recommendation did not require implementation.</p> <p>Regarding items 100 through 108, the Office of Emergency Management has begun working with the Legislative Department to update emergency plans including the provisions identified in Appendix 4 of the City's Readiness and Response Plan regarding continuity of government and continuity of operations. We expect this work to be completed in the first quarter of 2006. As a part of this process, we will also be working to achieve the standards recommended by the national Emergency Management Accreditation Program for continuity of government and continuity of operations planning.</p> <p>Additional Information Collected by the Office of City Auditor</p> <p>Office of City Auditor Note: The City Council did not craft the legislation suggested by TriData because if the City had an ordinance that said that certain things are exempt from disclosure because of terrorism, and the State Public Disclosure Act said they were not exempt from disclosure, the State disclosure law would prevail over the ordinance. The State Public Disclosure Act's security-related exemptions are contained in RCW 42.56.420. That section includes exemptions for "specific and unique" terrorism-vulnerability assessments or response or deployment plans (Subsection (1) (a)); and certain information about the infrastructure and security of computer and telecommunication networks (Subsection (4)). See http://apps.leg.wa.gov/RCW/default.aspx?cite=42.17.310.</p>
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TriData Recommendation #101	Require a 3/4 vote to terminate, modify, or reject any declaration of emergency or order during a declaration issued by the Mayor.
Status: CLOSED	The City Council decided that this recommendation did not require implementation.
12/5/05 Executive Response	Regarding items 100 through 108, the Office of Emergency Management has begun working with the Legislative Department to update emergency plans including the provisions identified in Appendix 4 of the City's Readiness and Response Plan regarding continuity of government and continuity of operations. We expect this work to be completed in the first quarter of 2006. As a part of this process, we will also be working to achieve the standards recommended by the national Emergency Management Accreditation Program for continuity of government and continuity of operations planning.
Additional Information Collected by the Office of City Auditor	

<p>TriData Recommendation #102</p> <p>Rated Urgent by TriData</p>	<p>Draft a set of emergency declarations and the accompanying orders to ensure that they are accessible for quick use during a crisis. A draft declaration should be prepared for each emergency situation that Seattle might be faced with. A draft should be prepared for every type of order the Mayor is authorized to issue under SMC 10.02.020. Since all City Councilmembers could potentially serve as the Mayor during an emergency, each Councilmember should be provided with copies of these orders to sign if needed.</p>
<p>Status: CLOSED</p> <p>12/5/05 Executive Response</p>	<p>The intent of this recommendation has been met. See below for details.</p> <p>Regarding items 100 through 108, the Office of Emergency Management has begun working with the Legislative Department to update emergency plans including the provisions identified in Appendix 4 of the City's Readiness and Response Plan regarding continuity of government and continuity of operations. We expect this work to be completed in the first quarter of 2006. As a part of this process, we will also be working to achieve the standards recommended by the national Emergency Management Accreditation Program for continuity of government and continuity of operations planning.</p>
	<p>Office of City Auditor Note: Although drafts have not been prepared for every type of declaration and order the City might have to issue during an emergency, the City decided it would be more efficient to create templates that could be used to quickly create declarations and orders that account for an emergency's unique circumstances. The City wanted to avoid having a huge, unwieldy set of draft emergency documents. For example, the orders drafted for a severe windstorm would likely differ significantly from those for a terrorist act. Furthermore, it doesn't make sense to try to draft an emergency declaration without knowing the type of emergency that you're dealing with because you have to cite the specific reasons for why you had to declare an emergency. The City's plan is for one or more of 12 designated Law Department attorneys to work with the appropriate City Councilmember (CM) if a CM had to serve as Mayor during an emergency.</p> <p>We visited the City's Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and the office of a Law Department attorney to view the notebooks that contained draft declarations and orders in hard copy and on disk. The notebooks also contain excerpts from the City Charter, Seattle Municipal Code, Revised Code of Washington, and other documents that an attorney might need when drafting emergency declarations and orders.</p> <p>According to the office of City Councilmember (CM) Richard Conlin, City Councilmembers have not</p>

[redacted] been provided with copies of emergency orders because the City Council believed that it was preferable to supply the draft declarations and orders to several Law Department attorneys who could then work with Councilmembers to develop the appropriate declarations and orders.

TriData Recommendation #103	<p>Revise SMC 10.02.030 to ensure that the Mayor has the ability to enter into contracts and incur liabilities, and also protect the rights of contractors. In an emergency situation, work often needs to be done immediately. If contractors cannot be assured that the contract will be honored they may not perform the work until the Council has authorized it. Depending on the severity of the crisis and whether other issues discussed below are addressed, this could critically hamper the City's ability to recover from a disaster.</p>
Status: CLOSED	<p>The City Council amended the Seattle Municipal Code to protect contractors' rights during an emergency.</p>
12/5/05 Executive Response	<p>Regarding items 100 through 108, the Office of Emergency Management has begun working with the Legislative Department to update emergency plans including the provisions identified in Appendix 4 of the City's Readiness and Response Plan regarding continuity of government and continuity of operations. We expect this work to be completed in the first quarter of 2006. As a part of this process, we will also be working to achieve the standards recommended by the national Emergency Management Accreditation Program for continuity of government and continuity of operations planning.</p>
Additional Information Collected by the Office of City Auditor	<p>Office of City Auditor Note: On August 14, 2006, the City Council amended Seattle Municipal Code section 10.02.030 to protect the rights of contractors who perform work for the City during an emergency proclaimed by the Mayor. The revised section ensures that contractors who, during a civil emergency, perform work based on contracts ordered by the Mayor will be paid for the work they performed up to the point at which the City Council rejects the Mayor's order. The Mayor signed the legislation on August 17, 2006.</p>

<p>TriData Recommendation #104</p> <p>Amend Article V, Section 9 of the City Charter to change the absence rules. The Mayor's role during an emergency is too important-both by code and by practice-to allow a City Council member to function in that role just because the Mayor is out of town. Today's communication capabilities easily permit the Mayor to be in constant contact with the top staff and Emergency Operations Center in case of a disaster. Only if and when the Mayor is unable to sustain contact with the City or is incapacitated should power cede to a Council member.</p>	<p>Status: CLOSED</p> <p>The City Council decided that this recommendation did not require implementation.</p> <p>12/5/05 Executive Response</p> <p>Regarding items 100 through 108, the Office of Emergency Management has begun working with the Legislative Department to update emergency plans including the provisions identified in Appendix 4 of the City's Readiness and Response Plan regarding continuity of government and continuity of operations. We expect this work to be completed in the first quarter of 2006. As a part of this process, we will also be working to achieve the standards recommended by the national Emergency Management Accreditation Program for continuity of government and continuity of operations planning.</p> <p>Additional Information Collected by the Office of City Auditor</p> <p>Office of City Auditor Note: The City Council examined other jurisdictions' charters and decided not to implement this recommendation.</p>
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<p>TriData Recommendation #105</p> <p>Rated Urgent by TriData</p>	<p>Amend Article V, Section 9 of the City Charter to allow for an expanded line of succession.</p> <p>Hopefully, the line of succession will never need to go below the President Pro Tempore of the City Council, but in order to ensure continuity of government, the City should expand the line of succession. Logically, the Deputy Mayor should be included in the expanded line of succession, as well as a high-level official not housed in City Hall.</p>
<p>Status: CLOSED</p>	<p>The City Council decided not to implement this recommendation because it proposed placing a non-elected official in the line of succession, and because State law and the City Charter specify line of succession processes for situations that extend beyond the City Council President Pro Tempore.</p>
<p>12/5/05 Executive Response</p> <p>Regarding items 100 through 108, the Office of Emergency Management has begun working with the Legislative Department to update emergency plans including the provisions identified in Appendix 4 of the City's Readiness and Response Plan regarding continuity of government and continuity of operations. We expect this work to be completed in the first quarter of 2006. As a part of this process, we will also be working to achieve the standards recommended by the national Emergency Management Accreditation Program for continuity of government and continuity of operations planning.</p> <p>Office of City Auditor Note: Article V Section 9 of the City Charter specifies that in cases in which the Mayor is absent or incapacitated, the City Council President would act as Mayor. If the City Council President is absent or incapacitated, the acting City Council President (i.e., President Pro Tempore) would act as Mayor.</p> <p>If the Mayor, City Council President, and acting City Council President were absent, dead or incapacitated because of enemy attack, state law (RCW 42.14.050) specifies that those available City Council members would elect one of their number to serve as Mayor.</p> <p>If the Mayor, City Council President, and acting City Council President were absent, dead or incapacitated because of an incident not involving enemy attack (e.g., natural disaster), according to the City Council's rules and procedures (I.C.1), the Councilmember listed next on the City Council's President Pro Tempore list would serve as Mayor.</p>	

<p>TriData Recommendation #106</p> <p>Rated Urgent by TriData</p> <p>Status: CLOSED</p> <p>12/5/05 Executive Response</p> <p>The City Council decided that this recommendation did not require implementation.</p> <p>Regarding items 100 through 108, the Office of Emergency Management has begun working with the Legislative Department to update emergency plans including the provisions identified in Appendix 4 of the City's Readiness and Response Plan regarding continuity of government and continuity of operations. We expect this work to be completed in the first quarter of 2006. As a part of this process, we will also be working to achieve the standards recommended by the national Emergency Management Accreditation Program for continuity of government and continuity of operations planning.</p> <p>Additional Information Collected by the Office of City Auditor</p> <p>Office of City Auditor Note: The Mayor's appointment or removal of City department heads is subject to, and becomes effective only upon, City Council confirmation. The Seattle Municipal Code also provides generally that whenever positions become vacant that are either (1) subject to appointment by the Mayor or (2) the heads of departments or offices created by ordinance, the next-highest ranking person in that department becomes the acting department head until a successor is appointed; exceptions may be made only if the Mayor, City Council President and City Council Finance Committee Chair agree.</p> <p>The report text preceding this recommendation indicates that TriData geared it toward an emergency scenario in which the Mayor decided that the number two person in a department would not be the appropriate person to become department head.</p> <p>Both the Seattle Municipal Code and City Charter would have to be changed to give the Mayor authority to unilaterally remove a department head and name a replacement without City Council concurrence.</p>	
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TriData Recommendation #108	<p>The City Council should continue to take the steps necessary to guarantee that it is able to act quickly by electronic means during times of emergencies, and that these meetings are conducted in a way that shields them from legal challenge. This should include revisions to its rules, and if warranted, to the Municipal Code.</p> <p>Status: CLOSED</p> <p>The City Council revised its rules to permit a City Councilmember, during an emergency, to use electronic means to attend a City Council meeting.</p>
<p>12/5/05 Executive Response</p> <p>Regarding items 100 through 108, the Office of Emergency Management has begun working with the Legislative Department to update emergency plans including the provisions identified in Appendix 4 of the City's Readiness and Response Plan regarding continuity of government and continuity of operations. We expect this work to be completed in the first quarter of 2006. As a part of this process, we will also be working to achieve the standards recommended by the national Emergency Management Accreditation Program for continuity of government and continuity of operations planning.</p> <p>Office of City Auditor Note: According to the City Clerk, the City Council worked with the Law Department to revise the Council's rules governing a scenario in which a catastrophic emergency made it impracticable for a City Councilmember to physically attend a Council meeting. The City Clerk stated that the rules change was approved by the City Council after a public comment period. The new section, found in Article II of the City Council's rules and procedures, reads as follows:</p> <p>“Attendance During an Emergency: In the event that a natural disaster, fire, flood, earthquake, enemy attack, imminent enemy attack, or other catastrophic emergency renders a Member’s physical attendance at a meeting impracticable, such Member may attend by any electronic means (e.g., multi-party telephone or video conferencing) utilized by the Council for such purpose.”</p> <p>Also, in November 2006, the voters approved a City Council-submitted City Charter amendment proposal (Seattle Charter Amendment No. 7) changing City Council quorum requirements. The changes accounted for an emergency situation, such as an earthquake or influenza epidemic, in which some City Councilmembers might be unable to attend emergency meetings due to death, illness or injury. The amendment allows the remaining Councilmembers to meet and make emergency decisions, and to fill the vacancies on the Council until an election could be held.</p>	

TriData Recommendation #110	The City needs to continue to coordinate with the County to determine what equipment their region needs that are acceptable, and submit the request to the State as soon as possible.
Status: CLOSED	The recommendation has been implemented.
12/5/05 Executive Response	<p>The City has long been a member of the King County-wide Multi-Discipline Equipment Planning Group and was a key player in the development of the Region 6 (county-wide) Homeland Security Strategic Plan, which was drafted in concert with the City and State strategies in mind.</p> <p>Office of City Auditor Note: The King County Emergency Manager confirmed that the County coordinates with the City of Seattle on emergency preparedness equipment needs. This coordination occurs both at official levels and informally through SPD's Director of Emergency Management and her staff.</p>
Additional Information Collected by the Office of Auditor	<p>On the official level, the city participates in the Multi-Disciplinary Equipment Planning Group (MEPG) of the EMAC/Region 6 Homeland Security Council. To coordinate planning and funding for emergency preparedness, the state is divided into 9 regions, of which Region 6 is one. Each of the nine regions has its own Homeland Security Council. These Councils are the mechanisms by which emergency preparedness policies and funding requests are developed and communicated to the State of Washington's Emergency Management Council (EMC). Washington State's EMC is the delegate agency through which federal homeland security grants are made.</p> <p>The Multidisciplinary Equipment Planning Group meets monthly to plan, coordinate and prioritize the selection of grant-funded weapons of mass destruction response equipment. This group has been a recipient of federal grants for regional equipment purchases since 1998. This workgroup includes representatives from fire service, agencies involved with hazardous materials, law enforcement, emergency medical services, health industry, emergency management, hospitals and public works. It is currently chaired by a Seattle Fire Department Chief. Information about when and where the MEPG meets can be found at http://www.metrokc.gov/prepare/homelandsecurity/homeandsecurity_workgroups.aspx.</p>

<p>TriData Recommendation #111</p> <p>The City should put together a comprehensive training proposal to the State, demonstrating need, goals/objectives, process, and amount of funding needed. The State seems to indicate in their proposal that they want a centralized approach for this, so the proposal should address regional training, and be helpful for the State to use in other jurisdictions. The training funds need to be geared to first responders.</p>	<p>Status: CLOSED</p> <p>The recommendation has been implemented.</p> <p>12/5/05 Executive Response</p> <p>The City is an active participant in the Region 6 Training and Exercise Committee, which recommends to the King County EMAC/Region 6 Homeland Security Council how to spend grant funds in the areas of training and exercise.</p> <p>Additional Information Collected by the Office of Auditor</p> <p>Office of City Auditor Note: The King County Emergency Manager confirmed that the City of Seattle and King County coordinate emergency preparedness training.</p> <p>Officially, the City participates in the Training and Exercises Workgroup of the EMAC/Region 6 Homeland Security Council. To coordinate planning and funding for emergency preparedness, the state is divided into 9 regions, of which Region 6 is one. Each of the 9 regions has its own Homeland Security Council. These Councils are the mechanisms by which emergency preparedness policies and funding requests are developed and communicated to the State of Washington's Emergency Management Council (EMC). Washington State's EMC is the delegate agency through which federal homeland security grants are made.</p> <p>The Training and Exercises Workgroup identifies critical training and exercise needs and standards. They coordinate available training and exercise funds, resources and efforts with partner agencies in King County. They also investigate alternate training delivery methods such as web-based materials, and coordinate and evaluate Washington State-provided training and exercise opportunities along with local needs. Information about when and where this Workgroup meets can be found at http://www.metrokc.gov/prepare/homelandsecurity/workgroups.aspx.</p>
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Appendix V

Open Recommendations – In process

TriData Recommendation #3	<p>The City should continue to work with the National Earthquake Hazard Reduction Program. If the funds for this program are removed, the City should fund the continued research in order to expand its reduction program.</p>
Status: OPEN	<p>The implementation of the recommendation is in process. The City still needs to perform economic modeling to map areas where there are vulnerable populations.</p>
12/5/05 Executive Response	<p>The City is actively participating in a combined effort to bring “Shakemap” capabilities to the Puget Sound area, which involves real time strong motion data to City of Seattle in event of an earthquake as well as enhance loss estimation modeling. Partner agencies include the United States Geological Survey, University of Washington Seismology Lab, URS Consultants, and Washington State Emergency Management Division.</p>
Additional Information Collected by the Office of Auditor	<p>University of Washington Seismology Lab response: FEMA pulled out its funding for this project after Hurricane Katrina, so the project has been stalled since last winter/spring. A meeting was held on September 19, 2006 to revitalize this effort. T.J. McDonald, Seattle Police Department, represented the City at the September meeting.</p> <p>The Shakemap project is a complex, two part program. The first part is to improve Shakemap capabilities for the greater Seattle area and the second is to perform economic modeling to map areas where there are vulnerable populations (low income, homeless, seniors, etc.). The University of Washington (UW) has stepped up to cover seismic monitoring and recently obtained funding for the critical staff UW needs to continue the project.</p> <p>The bottom line is that the project is still alive and moving forward. One outstanding question is: will the City work with UW in partnership or will they need additional resources? By summer 2007, we should have an improved Shakemap for the region. There are still some questions as to whether the economic loss estimation modeling will be completed.</p> <p>SPD response: URS Consultants is currently putting together a proposal to FEMA for implementing ShakeMap at the local and state levels. This proposal includes the use of HAZUS-MH, the software that can do economic modeling. The United States Geological Survey (USGS) provided a briefing on</p>

	<p>Shakemap for City stakeholders on October 31, 2006. At this meeting, City staff gave the USGS end user feedback about how ShakeMap, including its economic modeling component, could be used at the local level. According to one SPD official, although there is a slight possibility that the City might want to use the HAZUS-MH software to identify vulnerable populations, it is more likely that it will be used to estimate casualties based on ground motion and building stock. A follow up meeting is scheduled for December 2006.</p>
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<p>TriData Recommendation #11</p> <p>Status: OPEN</p> <p>12/5/05 Executive Response</p> <p>Additional Information Collected by the Office of City Auditor</p>	<p>The City should continue to develop and refine the “Landslide Policies” for the City. This should be an ongoing process involving the Landslide Policy Group to determine what areas are susceptible to landslides.</p> <p>SPU has several ongoing landslide prevention and mitigation efforts including the Seattle Mapping Project and a program to reduce the risks landslides pose to City-owned facilities.</p> <p>We agree that the City should continue to develop and refine policies relating to landslides. This will have to be a City-wide effort involving Law, Parks, SPU, SDOT, and DPD.</p> <p>SPU response: In 1998, the City’s Landslide Policy group developed a list of 13 action items for the City to reduce the impacts and/or occurrence of landslides. The City’s landslide policies have not undergone significant changes since that time, but there has been substantial work on determining what areas in the City are landslide prone areas (LPAs), which was one of the 13 action items. This work entailed creating a GIS layer to map the location of historic landslides. This task was completed under the Seattle Landslide Study (Shannon & Wilson, 2000, updated in 2003). In addition, the Steep Slope critical area was revised and adopted by ordinance. SPU along with the Department of Planning and Development (DPD) have been funding the Seattle Mapping project. This is an ongoing effort by the University of Washington to map the geology of the Seattle and surrounding area. This information was used by the United States Geological Survey (USGS) to create the recently released landslide hazard maps. SPU has one hard copy set of the completed maps.</p> <p>The attached table shows the City’s contributions to the University of Washington Seattle Mapping Project:</p> <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>City Dept</th><th>1999</th><th>2000</th><th>2001</th><th>2002</th><th>2003</th><th>2004</th><th>2005</th></tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>DPD</td><td>\$60K</td><td>\$60K</td><td>\$0</td><td>\$0</td><td>\$0</td><td>\$25K</td><td>\$25K</td></tr> <tr> <td>SPU</td><td>\$0</td><td>\$50K</td><td>\$25K</td><td>\$25K</td><td>\$25K</td><td>\$25K</td><td>\$25K</td></tr> </tbody> </table> <p>SPU has an ongoing landslide mitigation program to assess risks to City-owned facilities and undertake risk reducing actions and investments in landslide-prone areas that can reduce the long-run costs of operating these facilities. SPU also has spot drainage and small landslides programs that address stormwater runoff problems that contribute to localized flooding throughout the city and increase the risk of landslides in landslide prone areas.</p>	City Dept	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	DPD	\$60K	\$60K	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$25K	\$25K	SPU	\$0	\$50K	\$25K	\$25K	\$25K	\$25K	\$25K
City Dept	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005																		
DPD	\$60K	\$60K	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$25K	\$25K																		
SPU	\$0	\$50K	\$25K	\$25K	\$25K	\$25K	\$25K																		

Office of City Auditor Note: Information we obtained from SPU, SDOT, DPD, the Department of Executive Administration, and the Department of Finance indicates that 9 of the 13 actions items developed by the City's Landslide Policy group have been implemented or are ongoing efforts while 4 items will not be implemented.

TriData Recommendation #17	<p>The Emergency Management Bureau should acquire the necessary coordinated incident management system for use in the EOC operations. The approximate cost of a new CIMS is \$50 K. Considering the history of emergencies in the past seven years in Seattle, the software expense would probably be recouped within a year or two at most. The labor efficiency the system would provide in terms of hours saved to EOC and City staff is significant. Currently, staff must manually gather and record all the pertinent information for the grants (according to the City, this accounts for approximately 160 hours per event for the EOC staff only, not counting other City departments and agencies required to file documentation). The manual system is labor intensive and prone to potential error.</p>	<p>Status: OPEN</p> <p>12/5/05 Executive Response</p> <p>All concepts of Incident Command System are incorporated in the City's Emergency Operations Center operations in compliance with the National Incident Management System.</p> <p>Additional Information Collected by the Office of Auditor</p> <p>SPD response: The City collects post-disaster damage and repair information in an Excel spreadsheet format. The Office of Emergency Management intends to submit a better data collection application for grant funding in future Emergency Management Performance Grant cycles (FFY 2007). The cost for a new application will likely be much greater than the original \$50K estimate from 2003.</p> <p>The Office of Emergency Management has not yet received the Federal Fiscal Year 2007 Emergency Management Performance Grant (EMPG) application. OEM intends to invest in a post-incident information management system through this grant fund source.</p>
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TriData Recommendation #27:	<p>Address the various areas of building security identified as needing more attention. The City should put together a working committee made up of representatives of management, labor, and the police department to form working committees to address each of the areas listed above (i.e., on page 63 of the TriData report). This committee should be charged with making recommendations on methods to correct these identified deficiencies.</p> <p>**Note: the 12 items listed on page 63 of the TriData report are as follows:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Lighting (insufficient or no street light bulb replacement policy in some areas) 2. Promotion of security awareness 3. Parking (access control, camera protection, roving security forces) 4. Mail screening 5. Outdated security/protection equipment 6. Control of after hours events 7. Control of activity alongside City buildings 8. No control of exits and entrances 9. Poor directional signs 10. Inadequate control over access to underground tunnels, connecting gates and fences 11. Control of smokers in designated areas 12. Protection of ventilation systems from outside contaminants
Status: OPEN	<p>Individual departments are responsible for addressing security issues in the buildings they manage. However, there is currently no working group meeting on a regular basis to discuss facility security issues.</p> <p>Building security needs are under constant review and are updated and improved as issues are identified, whether via day-to-day operations, SPD security assessments or via emergency response planning.</p> <p>FFD response: The twelve items listed above apply to multiple departments. For instance, #1 re street lighting, #9 re directional signs and #10 re tunnels would fall under the control of SDOT, WSDOT and/or Metro/King County. As noted in the December 12, 2005 response, security needs are constantly being reviewed and updated and we reconfirm that is the case, as it relates to facilities under the management of FFD.</p> <p>Departments share security information on an ad hoc basis. Although individual departments</p>
12/5/05 Executive Response	

	Sometimes collaborate to address specific security issues, there is currently no working group meeting on a regular basis.
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TriData Recommendation #28	The City should create a formal risk assessment process to evaluate, address and monitor security/protection.
Status: OPEN	Individual departments are responsible for addressing security issues in the buildings they manage, including preparing risk assessments. There is no <u>formal</u> citywide risk assessment process for building security.
12/5/05 Executive Response	An interdepartmental committee comprised of representatives from SPD, SPU, SCL, and SDOT currently is in place to evaluate and implement changes to standardize and improve security measures throughout the City.
Additional Information Collected by the Office of Auditor	<p>FFD response: City staff who are responsible for security at City facilities evaluate risks associated with their facilities and operations on an ongoing basis, both individually and through the combined resources of the interdepartmental committee.</p> <p>Office of City Auditor Note: There is no <u>formal</u> citywide risk assessment process. Instead, risk assessments for City facilities are conducted on a department-by-department basis.</p>

<p>TriData Recommendation #34</p> <p>Federal Government guidelines involving workplace violence should be considered for adoption by the City. The City should monitor compliance with these and other workplace violence management initiatives, to ensure that they are being implemented properly. This practice could reduce liability for the City. The Federal Government guidelines are a good foundation for developing a workplace violence prevention program.</p>	<p>Status: OPEN</p> <p>The recommendation's implementation is in process because A) not all City employees have received workplace violence prevention training, and B) Personnel needs to audit departments' implementation of the program.</p>	<p>12/5/05 Executive Response</p> <p>Personnel has work place violence guidelines.</p> <p>Additional Information Collected by the Office of City Auditor</p> <p>Personnel response: In September 1995, Mayor Rice issued an Executive Order stipulating that department heads implement internal policies and procedures in their departments. In 2002, Ordinance 120938 was passed, creating a new Seattle Municipal Code Chapter 4.78, <i>Workplace Violence Prevention Program</i>. Personnel Rule 8.1 “<i>Workplace Violence Prevention</i>” was completed in May 2004. A brochure “<i>Promoting employee safety and security; Preventing workplace violence</i>,” was also developed at that time and over the next several months, distributed to all City departments for their use in employee training. The City of Seattle’s <i>Workplace Violence Prevention Policy and Program</i> was introduced in late 2004, with a planned implementation over the next three years. The Personnel Department has a Citywide Workplace Violence Coordinator whose responsibility is to “oversee and administer the Citywide Workplace Violence Prevention Program, develop procedures and training materials, assist with training, maintain a citywide log of workplace violence incidents, and evaluate the program.”</p> <p>The program's documents consist of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Seattle Municipal Code Chapter 4.78 “<i>Workplace Violence Prevention Program</i>” • Personnel Rule 8.1 <i>Workplace Violence Prevention</i> • Workplace Violence Prevention Program • List of Department Workplace Violence Prevention Coordinators • Forms: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Employee Survey ○ Inspection for Security Hazards
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	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Incident Report ○ Workplace Violence Incident Log <p>To help develop the City's program, the Personnel Department referred to the guidebook "Workplace Violence - Awareness and Prevention for Employers and Employees" published by Washington State Department of Labor and Industries, WISHA Services Division. The WISHA program in Washington State (Chapter 49.17 RCW - Washington Industrial Safety and Health Act) equals or exceeds the minimum standards prescribed by the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (Public Law 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590).</p>
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<p>TriData Recommendation #47</p> <p>The Fire Department and the Emergency Management Bureau should examine all facets of their response system to ensure preparedness for response to incidents of terrorism and illicit use of hazardous materials. This review should include existing plans, operating procedures, equipment, training, and exercises.</p>	<p>Status: OPEN</p> <p>SFD and the SPD Emergency Preparedness Bureau have to finalize the Terrorism Annex to the City's Disaster Readiness and Response Plan.</p>	<p>SFD conducts an annual review of its level of preparedness as a component of its Policy and Operating Procedures updates. SFD and SPD are finalizing a Terrorism Annex to the City's Disaster Readiness and Response Plan. SFD has updated the Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC) Hazardous Materials Response Guidelines for inclusion in the City's Disaster Readiness and Response Plan.</p> <p>SFD response: SFD and the SPD Emergency Preparedness Bureau have been working to increase the City's preparedness to respond to incidents of terrorism and illicit use of hazardous materials. The City's Disaster Readiness and Response Plan defines the roles of City departments during such incidents. SFD's role during incidents of terrorism or illicit use of hazardous substances is to mitigate their effects on the City.</p> <p>SFD's Operations Division performs an annual review of its policies and procedures, including those dealing with hazardous material releases. According to SFD's Assistant Chief of Staff, concerns about hazardous materials releases have shifted in recent years from industrial releases to criminal releases. This has led to changes in the City's procedures for dealing with hazardous materials.</p> <p>An annex to the City's Disaster Readiness and Recovery Plan defines the role of City departments in responding to mass casualty hazardous materials incidents. SFD's Operating Guidelines provide guidance to SFD personnel on Hazardous Materials Operations.</p> <p>SFD continues to experience communications equipment shortages due to funding. Currently only 500 of the 1,000 firefighters have portable radios available to them.</p> <p>Emergency Management Bureau response: The City plans to finalize the Terrorism Annex during the last quarter of 2006.</p>
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	<p>Office of City Auditor Note: During our August 22, 2006 meeting with SFD's Chief of Staff, we reviewed the SFD Operating Guidelines on Hazardous Materials Operations. During our August 29, 2006 meeting with SFD's Chief of Operations, we reviewed the LEPC Guidelines.</p>
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<p>TriData Recommendation #59</p> <p>Rated Urgent by TriData</p>	<p>A comprehensive assessment of current alarm, intrusion, surveillance, and other security systems should be undertaken by all utilities working together. The findings of this assessment should drive a comprehensive strategic plan to upgrade, replace, and in many cases, install for the first time, coordinated, networked security systems. During this initiative, care should be taken to avoid disclosure of vulnerabilities during design, bidding, or budgeting processes.</p> <p>Status: OPEN</p> <p>12/5/05 Executive Response</p> <p>Additional Information Collected by the Office of City Auditor</p> <p>SPU's and SCL's implementation of this recommendation will require several years of work.</p> <p>SPU participates in a citywide working group hosted by SPD and FFD that is in the early stages of addressing these issues.</p> <p>SPU response: SPU had a comprehensive vulnerability assessment by Sandia National Laboratories of its assets and security system and is currently implementing an integrated security improvement program to address the findings and elevate the security of our solid waste, drinking water and wastewater infrastructures. As we implement our security improvements, we are utilizing agreed upon standards with our networking system to allow consolidation and data sharing with other city departments and agencies in the future.</p> <p>SPU is working with Seattle City Light (SCL) and the Fleets and Facilities Department in coordinating applications of security technologies to ensure standard application and interoperability of all equipment utilized.</p> <p>When implemented, SCL will supply the City Council with a written description of the recommendation's outcome.</p> <p>Office of City Auditor Note: we reviewed the Sandia National Laboratories vulnerability assessment.</p> <p>SCL response:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SCL is working with SPU and FFD to coordinate applications of security technologies to ensure standard application and interoperability of all equipment utilized. • SCL is using the CH2M Hill Vulnerability Assessment recommendations to upgrade security system at all its critical facilities. SCL facilities were ranked in priority order recommending varying degrees of security improvements in the areas of detection, intrusion alarms, surveillance systems and access control. Security improvements to SCL facilities will be completed by December 2010.
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	<p>Office of City Auditor Note: We reviewed the CH2M Hill study and the SCL plan for improving security at its critical facilities.</p>
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TriData Recommendation #60	<p>Contemporary user interfaces, ergonomic furniture, lighting, and space design should be part of a complete replacement or remodeling of the control room and the equipment housed there.</p> <p>During this upgrade, consideration should be given to off-site back up for the facility, including mission critical operational backup using a laptop computer.</p>
Status: OPEN	<p>SPU is remodeling its control and dispatch facilities.</p>
12/5/05 Executive Response	<p>SPU is in the process of remodeling its Control Center and Dispatch Center. The design has taken these issues on and it is expected that we will return in 2006/2007 to locations that have taken all of these elements into consideration.</p>
Additional Information Collected by the Office of City Auditor	<p>SPU response: During and after the remodel of SPU's operations control center and its security monitoring and dispatch center, these two centers will be kept physically separate. After the remodel, each will have a back up location in separate areas and buildings.</p>

TriData Recommendation #61	The wastewater collection control system should be consolidated with drainage control activities into the central control center.
Status: OPEN	SPU plans to consolidate wastewater and drainage control activities in 2008.
12/5/05 Executive Response	SPU is considering this activity.
Additional Information Collected by the Office of City Auditor	SPU response: The implementation plan to consolidate the wastewater and drainage control activities into the central control center was presented to SPU's Asset Management Committee on August 3, 2006. The committee approved the plan and the installation of system components will begin in 2008.

TriData Recommendation #62 12/5/05 Executive Response	<p>The installation of ignition defeat systems in heavy trucks, which disable the vehicle if the employee is not in the vehicle, should be considered as a means of preventing theft and use in terrorism. For all SPU heavy equipment fleet vehicles, a secondary ignition cut-off switch is a desirable security feature to prevent vehicle theft.</p> <p>Status: OPEN</p> <p>SPU is considering installation of ignition defeat systems.</p>
Additional Information Collected by the Office of City Auditor	<p>SPU response: Installation of ignition defeat systems is still under consideration. SPU is weighing the cost/benefit analysis. This item will be considered by SPU's Security and Emergency Management Oversight Committee and may be referred to SPU's Asset Management Committee in 2007. Additionally, SPU heavy equipment fleet vehicles are equipped with secondary ignition cut-off switches.</p> <p>SPU's Solid Waste Operations Division is in the midst of an AVL tracking pilot program. This system helps Solid Waste Operations ensure that the truck hauling routes are efficient and safe.</p>

<p>TriData Recommendation #63</p> <p>12/5/05 Executive Response</p> <p>Additional Information Collected by the Office of City Auditor</p>	<p>Seattle should stock several spare transformers of sufficient capacity to speed recovery in the event that an attack or natural disaster incapacitates one or more of these transformers. The City may also wish to consider a migration to the common standards used by the electric industry, which would allow the borrowing or purchase of transformers and other critical components.</p> <p>Status: OPEN</p> <p>SCL is conducting analysis to respond to this recommendation.</p> <p>SCL response: SCL designs its substations to N-1 standard meaning that the station can operate at 100 percent operations with one transformer down. Recognizing that spare transformers would add to SCL's capability to restore service more quickly, SCL is assessing the types of transformers and other critical parts of its electrical system that might be stocked.</p> <p>The coverage needs for large substation transformers has to be further reviewed. While we have sufficient coverage for most pole and pad type transformers, the larger substation transformers require a much wider technical review. Due to the cost outlay in purchasing a substation transformer, SCL Engineering needs to look at how wide a coverage area (number of independent substation locations) they can achieve by a single spare transformer or multiple spares. The replacement process is not as simple as taking one out and replacing it with another because various transformer operating data needs to fit the system appropriately. Factors to be considered include short circuit duty, impedance, voltage, and regulation. SCL Engineering will need additional time to come up with the correct scenarios to fit the variable sight situations. We expect to have this completed by February 2007</p> <p>SCL is also working with a consortium of public utilities to determine the types of transformers that could be available for delivery during times of disasters.</p>
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TriData Recommendation #72 Rated Urgent by TriData	<p>All council members, department heads, and other top officials should receive training in how to communicate to the media using the one voice strategy. To supplement this training, Unit Three (Communicating in an Emergency) of the Emergency Management Institute's Effective Communication independent study, was included in the TriData report as Appendix C.</p> <p>Status: OPEN</p> <p>Implementation of the recommendation is in process via the “one message” concept. Executive level training has been developed but not scheduled.</p> <p>See the “one message” concept in question/response #70. One of our Urban Area projects is to design the curriculum for just such training for elected and senior level officials, which should be completed in late Spring, 2006.</p> <p>Additional Information Collected by the Office of Auditor</p> <p>SPD response: An executive level training curriculum has been developed by a consultant through the use of an Urban Area Security Initiative grant. The consultant recently finalized a train-the-trainer module in order to prepare local staff to provide the training. The concept of speaking with a unified message during emergencies will be incorporated within this training. It is not a stand-alone concept, but rather one element in a host of executive level skills needed in times of emergency. SPD is working with the consultant to offer a train-the-trainer session in late January 2007. Once trainers have gone through this session, the training will be offered to elected officials and senior level officials. Also, there is an opportunity for elected officials and senior level officials to participate in similar, but more topic-specific, crisis communication training on January 17, 2007 offered by Dr. Peter Sandman.</p>

<p>TriData Recommendation #73 Rated Urgent by TriData</p>	<p>The City of Seattle should designate primary and alternate modes of communication for each department and agency responsible for emergency or disaster operations. It should define which departments and agencies should use radio communications and the circumstances under which these should be used. Departments and agencies with responsibilities not requiring radio communications should identify alternate means of communication.</p> <p>Status: OPEN</p> <p>DOIT is drafting a communications annex that will attempt to respond to the recommendation.</p> <p>12/5/05 Executive Response</p> <p>This hasn't been done formally by the City or by individual departments. It certainly is standard practice, however, e.g. in SPD primary mode is 800 MHz radio and alternate is Computer-Aided-Dispatch via a separate wireless network.</p> <p>DOIT response: To date it has been a business question for each City department to formally designate primary and alternate modes of communication for emergency or disaster operations. However, in conjunction with the re-organization of Emergency Support Functions (ESF's) in the SPD Office of Emergency Management, DOIT is drafting a communications annex for ESF-2, which will attempt to address this issue of primary and alternate communication modes.</p>
	<p>Departments which currently have complete radio capability with the City's 800 MHz trunked network are the Seattle Police Department, Seattle Fire Department, Seattle Public Utilities, and Seattle Center. SDOT operates its own 450 MHz radio network, but has purchased a number of 800 MHz portable radios to establish interoperability with the other departments. City Light operates its own 800 MHz network on separate frequencies. Each department establishes its own protocols for radio use. Each department uses its radios daily for normal operations. On the City 800 MHz trunked network, there are well over 65,000 "push-to-talk" operations each day.</p> <p>Although City Light's operation of its own 800 MHz network on separate frequencies could somewhat hamper its communications with other City departments during an emergency, talk groups on City Light's system can be patched with talk groups on the regional 800 MHz system at the dispatch level so communications can flow between units in the field.</p> <p>Seattle Department of Transportation (SDOT) response: When the City migrated from the 450 MHz radio system to the newer 800 MHz system, SDOT elected to continue to use the 450 radios for daily operations. However, to ensure interoperability with other City departments, SDOT has 31 800 MHz radios and another 18 on order. These have been in place for some time in dispatch centers and</p>

in vehicles used by supervisors.

TriData Recommendation #76	The City should work with the local area 700 MHz planning group to have this allocation made before January 1, 2008 and prepare an application for 700 MHz spectrum to meet future needs.
Status: OPEN	The City is seeking authorization to use the 700 MHz spectrum.
12/5/05 Executive Response	The City is represented by Jon Wiswell of DoIT's Communications Shop on the regional 700 MHz planning group and they are preparing a plan for spectrum use. DoIT has also applied for an experimental FCC license to use the 700 MHz spectrum when it becomes available.
Additional Information Collected by the Office of City Auditor	DOIT response: The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) required governments to submit plans outlining how they would use MHz frequencies available on 700 MHz before the FCC offered them to private sector entities. The State of Washington (Region 43) prepared a plan for use of 700 MHz frequencies that was approved by the FCC, and the State's 700 MHZ planning committee is almost done with developing its procedures for evaluating local jurisdictions' applications for use of frequencies. The request will be reviewed by the committee, and requesting entities, such as the City of Seattle, must have a high level official attest in writing that the requester has the funding and equipment to make use of the new frequencies. Seattle has submitted an experimental license application to the FCC.

TriData Recommendation #81	The City should allocate additional funds for use by the Chief Information Security Officer to hire additional staff or implement citywide IT security, risk management, and threat mitigation programs.
Status: OPEN	The City has not yet implemented a consolidated security event monitoring system that is staffed by a full-time employee.
12/5/05 Executive Response	<p>See answer to recommendation #80.</p> <p>DOIT response: DoIT hired Michael Hamilton as CISO (he replaced Kirk Bailey, who left to take a similar position at the UW). David Matthews has been hired as Deputy CISO. A number of other employees in multiple departments perform part-time duties under their direction.</p> <p>The current greatest information security needs are:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Monitoring improvements. The City requires a consolidated security event monitoring system, to provide visibility into all logical network segments. Additionally, monitoring devices are required for internal network segments where high-value or sensitive (confidential, restricted) information resources reside. The combination of additional monitoring and event aggregation and correlation capability will allow the City to provide adequate detective and responsive controls, where preventive controls are currently not in place or possible to deploy. Staffing: 1 FTE is required to provide engineering and operational support for the monitoring infrastructure, to validate suspected security incidents, to design and implement incident response triggers, and to create monitoring reports that provide executive access to the current state of the City's IT security risks. <p>Office of City Auditor Note: According to DOIT, although a security event monitoring system and associated FTE request were not part of DOIT's 2007-2008 budget request, DOIT can use existing systems and a newly hired employee on a half-time basis to achieve similar functionality.</p>

<p>TriData Recommendation #90</p> <p>The City of Seattle, via PHSKC, should work with local hospitals to better define procedures to follow when their on-site capabilities are overwhelmed. Harborview Medical Center, as the area's primary trauma referral center, should be asked to play a key role in this process. While PHSKC should play a lead role in this process, other City agencies (such as public utilities, the Fire Department, the Police Department, etc.) have specific parts to play as well.</p>	<p>Status: OPEN</p> <p>Significant progress has been made in this area and plans and resources are in place to continue the effort.</p> <p>This issue requires much more work to incorporate a hospital presence into the Seattle EOC along with PHSKC. Protocols for addressing the medical needs of health care facilities are developed and currently being refined. Protocols need to be developed for hospitals in Seattle to communicate with the Seattle EOC to request non-medical assistance.</p> <p>PHSKC response: Protocols addressing how hospitals in Seattle request health and medical assistance have been in place for years and are currently being streamlined. However, protocols for receiving and processing requests from Seattle hospitals for non-medical assistance have yet to be developed. On-going coordination is occurring between Public Health, hospitals within the city of Seattle and the Seattle Emergency Management Office to accommodate hospital representation in the city Emergency Operations Center (EOC) during emergencies and to develop resource management protocols for non-medical resources.</p> <p>PHSKC recently worked out an agreement with Barb Graff, the City's Director of Emergency Management, to have hospitals call her office (the EOC) in an emergency. The City's emergency duty officer will then direct the calls to the most appropriate response agency. Past practice has been to forward calls to PHSKC, however, PHSKC does not have the same direct link with the responsible department(s) as SPD does, so it makes more sense to forward calls for non-medical assistance to the EOC.</p> <p>PHSKC is also working with Seattle's Director of Emergency Management to secure a place in the EOC for a representative of the Regional Emergency Preparedness Group. This presence is essential if there is to be effective coordination between medical and non-medical needs during an emergency.</p> <p>Regional Emergency Preparedness Group response: The City of Seattle has not been a partner with hospitals until recently, when a new Emergency Management Director came on board (Barb</p>
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	<p>Graff). We had our first meeting in late August 2006. All the hospitals in the area were represented at the meeting. From now on, this group will meet every other month. We have already made significant progress in developing protocols for hospitals to request non-medical assistance and will continue to work on this issue.</p> <p><u>Re: protocols for requesting health and medical assistance.</u> REPG is currently developing a position called the Regional Medical Resource Coordinator, whose job it will be to develop a plan for hospitals and medical facilities to share resources in an emergency. This Regional Medical Resource Coordinator will be based at Harborview and the position is funded by the federal Health Resources and Services Administration for 18 months. The Regional Medical Resource Coordinator will create something akin to an Emergency Operations Center, but addressing health issues—a Medical Operations Center.</p> <p>REPG has not yet decided the best location for our key point-of-contact in an emergency. Both the City and the County want to partner with us, so we will need to decide—should we have a presence in the King County EOC or the City EOC? We expect our planning process will determine the best location for a hospital emergency contact in the event of an emergency.</p>
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<p>TriData Recommendation #94</p> <p>The City of Seattle should work closely with PHSKC to revise the Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS) plan for response to a bioterrorist attack or public health emergency. Special attention should be paid to the integration of regional and state plans and resources into the local plan.</p>	<p>Status: OPEN</p> <p>SFD reported that implementation of this recommendation is still in process because the Pandemic Influenza Plan Annex is still in draft.</p>	<p>12/5/05 Executive Response</p> <p>Public Health and Seattle Fire Department have been working closely to join MMRS planning efforts with public health planning for all hazards. Seattle Fire Department staff are now members of public health planning work groups for mass dispensing and mass vaccination. Seattle Police Department has been actively engaged in the Cities Readiness Initiative, enforcement of isolation and quarantine measures, and security planning for distribution of immunizations and antibiotics.</p>	<p>SFD response: Public Health Seattle King County (PHSKC) is integrated into the MMRS Advisory Board and the MMRS is integrated into PHSKC Disaster Planning groups. The updated MMRS Plan includes a biological component and an updated annex with a “Pandemic Influenza/Contagious Disease Plan”. Regional, State and Federal resources are accounted for in the plans.</p> <p>Currently, an emphasis is being placed on planning for pandemic flu outbreaks. SFD with PHSKC and other city and county stakeholders have been working together to plan for a potential outbreak.</p> <p>Office of City Auditor Note: The Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS) Program began in 1996 and currently is funded by the United States Department of Homeland Security. The primary focus of the MMRS program is to develop or enhance existing emergency preparedness systems to effectively respond to a public health crisis, particularly an event involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Information on the MMRS Program is available at the following website:</p> <p>http://mmrs.fema.gov/Main/About.aspx</p> <p>During our August 29, 2006 meeting with SFD's Assistant Chief of Operations, we reviewed a copy of the City of Seattle's Metro Medical Response System Biological Incident Plan, which was developed by SFD, the Seattle Police Department, and Public Health Seattle King County. The Assistant Chief explained that when the TriData report was issued in 2003, the City of Seattle had chemical and radiological incident response plans, but had not created a biological incident response plan. We also reviewed SFD's July 27, 2001 Influenza/Infectious Disease Plan.</p>
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	The Assistant Chief noted that SFD representatives are members of all of the regional public health committees.
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TriData Recommendation #95	The City of Seattle should work with local jurisdictions to create public health-specific mutual aid agreements or memorandums of understanding to ensure adequate resources during a bioterrorist attack or communicable disease outbreak.
Status: OPEN	PHSKC continues to work with City departments to identify needed resources and develop MOUs when appropriate.
12/5/05 Executive Response	Progress has been made on this issue as mutual aid agreements have been initiated for various Seattle facilities to serve as mass dispensing and mass vaccination sites. More work needs to be done to finalize MOUs for other types of facilities.
Additional Information Collected by the Office of Auditor	PHSKC response: PHSKC continues to work with City departments to identify needed resources and develop MOUs when appropriate. PHSKC would use the secondary treatment facilities described in Recommendation 91 (see Appendix IV), to respond to a bioterrorist attack or communicable disease outbreak. PHSKC has mutual aid agreements for these centers.

TriData Recommendation #99	<p>Revise the current Disaster Readiness and Response Plan to include a COG section (or annex) or develop a separate COG plan. There are several guides and instructions available that describe the requirements for the development of a COG plan. An example is the FEMA Civil Preparedness Guide (CPG) 1-10, Guide for the Development of a State and Local Continuity of Government Capability. The guide addresses succession, predelegation of emergency authorities, emergency operating centers (EOCs), alternate EOCs, emergency action stops, protection of vital records, and the protection of government resources, personnel, and facilities associated with COG responsibilities.</p>
Status: OPEN	<p>The implementation of the recommendation is in process.</p>
12/5/05 Executive Response	<p>There is a continuity of government section of the Disaster Readiness and Response Plan located in Appendix 4, which serves as a template for all City Departments and agencies. This will be reviewed and updated with Departments as a part of the regular plan update process in 2006.</p>

Additional Information Collected by the Office of Auditor

SPD response: The Continuity of Government (COG) section of the Seattle Disaster Readiness and Response Plan is a template for City Departments to use in developing or updating their individual plans. All departments have been asked to address continuity of government issues regarding essential missions and lines of succession, particularly to address pandemic flu planning. The majority of the plans (17 of 25) have been submitted, and the remaining departments are making good progress on their plans.

TriData Recommendation #107 Rated Urgent by TriData	<p>Establish the Emergency Operations Center as the designated backup meeting location for the City Council in case City Hall cannot be reached.</p> <p>Status: OPEN</p>	<p>Implementation of the recommendation is in process.</p> <p>Regarding items 100 through 108, the Office of Emergency Management has begun working with the Legislative Department to update emergency plans including the provisions identified in Appendix 4 of the City's Readiness and Response Plan regarding continuity of government and continuity of operations. We expect this work to be completed in the first quarter of 2006. As a part of this process, we will also be working to achieve the standards recommended by the national Emergency Management Accreditation Program for continuity of government and continuity of operations planning.</p> <p>SPD response: The purpose of the Emergency Operations Center is to serve as the central operational coordination facility for emergency response and disaster recovery. As such, there are security requirements that are counterproductive to the purpose of the City Council meeting in a format designed to facilitate open dialogue with and on behalf of its constituents. The Office of Emergency Management is working with the Legislative Department to identify other more suitable back-up locations for City Council meetings. On page 75 of the Seattle Disaster Readiness and Response Plan, Basic Plan, under "Common Responsibilities" item 1c states, "Establish emergency back up locations for all critical functions, to include having necessary arrangements and procedures in place for making an orderly transition." This is a responsibility of all City Departments, including the Legislative Department.</p> <p>Legislative Department response: We do not have designated backup meeting location at this time. We are considering one of the libraries as a back-up location but have not yet made our final decision as to the specific location. The Legislative Department is in the process of hiring a consultant to help us develop an emergency preparedness plan and address issues related to continuance of government. We expect to know more about our plans by the end of the year.</p> <p>Office of City Auditor Note: In November 2006, the voters approved a City Council-submitted amendment to the City Charter (Seattle Charter Amendment No. 6) that would allow the City Council to meet in alternate locations in the event of certain emergencies or disasters.</p>
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Appendix VI Open Recommendations – Policy Decisions

TriData Recommendation #39	<p>Action should be taken to provide a dedicated funding source for reimbursement of all mutual aid partners. The intent is to make sure there are not delays in actions due to questions about paying for them. This can be achieved by establishing inter-local agreements that specifically lay out procedures for financial accounting and reimbursement when mutual aid is given or received.</p>
Status: OPEN	<p>Implementation of the recommendation is a state, regional, and local budget issue.</p>
12/5/05 Executive Response <p>Additional Information Collected by the Office of Auditor</p> <p>SPD response: There is no dedicated budget in Washington State to cover these costs, but SPD would be supportive of the concept, and the City's Office of Intergovernmental Relations (OIR) is aware of SPD's position on this issue.</p> <p>It is important to distinguish between obtaining a dedicated funding source to reimburse our mutual aid partners and the City's ability to invoke mutual aid when needed. Currently, all the jurisdictions we have mutual aid compacts with absorb the costs of supporting us in their own budgets, just as we do when we support them. We have no ability to reimburse one another, nor a dedicated source of funding from which to do so. Under the State of Washington Mutual Aid Police Powers Act, we agree to help one another without compensation or reimbursement. All affected parties understand that "if you agree to assist, it's on your dime."</p> <p>SPD's policy is that if we receive help from another jurisdiction during an event or emergency, and happen to get reimbursed for our costs, we will pass the appropriate payment on to them. SPD provides mutual aid to other jurisdictions all the time. For example, we recently assisted the City of Bellevue during President Bush's visit. We absorbed the additional cost of this assistance in our own budget.</p> <p>The problems that occurred during the WTO meeting in Seattle did not have to do with lack of response from our mutual aid partners or Seattle waiting too long to arrange for additional police forces. With the exception of the National Guard, we had them all lined up and ready to go six weeks before the WTO meetings, and they responded when called upon. Rather, the problem was with the overall police capacity in this area. There are only 6,200 police officers in the entire State of Washington, and 1,300 of them work for SPD.</p>	

OIR response: The City lobbied for and received federal funds to pay for some of the costs incurred during WTO. We used these funds to reimburse all responding jurisdictions at 100 percent of their costs with the exception of the three sponsoring jurisdictions- Seattle, King County and the State of Washington.

TriData Recommendation #75	The City of Seattle should purchase a reserve of pre-programmed 800 MHz portable radios and store them at several different sites around the City for use in a large-scale emergency.
Status: OPEN	The City has no plans to establish a reserve of 800 MHz radios. However, virtually all SPD sworn personnel have been issued pre-programmed 800 MHz radios, and about half of SFD firefighters have them.
12/5/05 Executive Response	This has not technically occurred. However, every police officer – both on and off duty – has been issued a radio. Using UASI grants, the Seattle Fire Department has procured a number of additional 800 MHz radios to establish a pool (Seattle Fire has enough radios for every on-duty firefighter now). The City has an agreement with Motorola to supply additional radios on short notice, and Motorola has consistently demonstrated its willingness and ability to do this during actual disasters such as September 11th and Katrina.
Additional Information Collected by the Office of City Auditor	DOIT response: Over 14,400 radios have been issued in King County – mostly to police and fire personnel in King County. All are potentially sharable. With TRIS and the interoperable communications vehicle (see DOIT response to recommendation #74), almost any agency arriving on a scene with a portable radio can be made sharable / interoperable.

SPD and SFD radios are generally pre-programmed with both police and fire talk groups. There are 25 frequencies in the City's 800 MHz trunked radio network, but there are several hundred "talk groups" each of which is a group of users (e.g., a police precinct). The talk groups share the 25 frequencies (hence the name "trunked"). The standard police radio template, for example, includes Fire talk groups.

We know that Motorola provided additional radios for Louisiana jurisdictions after Katrina. With TRIS and the interoperable communications vehicle, this capability has less importance for disaster response.

Office of City Auditor Note: According to a Seattle Police Department official we interviewed, "about 99 percent" of all SPD sworn personnel have been issued pre-programmed 800 MHz radios. There are a small number of detectives who share 800 MHz radios. However, next year with SPD's adoption of the Motorola XPS portable radio, every sworn officer will be issued their own radio.

	<p>During our meeting with the Seattle Fire Department's (SFD) Assistant Chief for Operations, he stated that about half (i.e., 500) of the approximate 1,000 SFD firefighters have been issued 800 MHz portable radios. In normal circumstances, this does not pose a major problem because about 280 SFD firefighters are on duty during the day. However, during a large-scale emergency, there could be problems because there could be more fire fighters on duty than available radios. Since the TriData report was issued in 2003, SFD acquired about 150 more radios to bring the total up to about 500. The Assistant Chief said the City's emergency capabilities would be improved if every SFD firefighter had their own radio.</p>
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TriData Recommendation #91	<p>Hospitals need to develop teams that would staff schools or other locales where secondary treatment centers would be set up. Identified schools should be stocked with the necessary medical supplies, cots, and backup generators. Although hospitals are well staffed with expertly trained personnel, the call up plan requires further refinement.</p>
Status: OPEN	<p>To fully implement this recommendation, PHSKC needs funding for additional planning staff.</p>
12/5/05 Executive Response	<p>Public Health is leading this planning effort and coordinating with hospitals and other agencies to build needed capabilities. Teams are in place to provide vaccines and antibiotics at secondary facilities in Seattle. Additional functions for secondary facilities such as triage and supportive care are being developed.</p> <p>PHSKC response: Capabilities are under development (yet require additional resources) for establishing mass treatment, vaccination and antibiotic dispensing centers within Seattle.</p> <p>There are four main types of secondary treatment centers: 1) isolation centers, 2) quarantine centers, 3) mass vaccination and dispensing centers, and 4) alternate care facilities (e.g., providing a space like a large gym with cots and limited nurse provider care and medications for overflow hospital capacity). PHSKC has made significant progress planning for isolation, quarantine, and mass vaccination and dispensing centers, but is still working on establishing alternate care facilities.</p> <p>PHSKC has established how they will work with law enforcement and staff the isolation, quarantine and mass vaccination centers. PHSKC has Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) with other city and community based agencies regarding these centers.</p> <p>In light of the current staffing shortage in nursing at most hospitals, it would not be appropriate to call hospital staff into these centers in the event of an emergency.</p> <p>To fully implement this recommendation, PHSKC needs funding for additional planning staff.</p>

<p>TriData Recommendation #92</p> <p>Rated Urgent by TriData</p>	<p>City of Seattle and King County public officials should lobby the State of Washington (and federal government if necessary) to allocate more funds to the front-line agencies responsible for bioterrorism preparedness and response, unless the State itself will take some of the direct responsibility for the programs.</p> <p>Status: OPEN</p> <p>12/5/05 Executive Response</p> <p>Additional Information Collected by the Office of Auditor</p> <p>This is an ongoing effort for the City of Seattle and King County.</p> <p>The Public Health Department agrees. Public Health preparedness efforts in King County are currently funded 100% through federal grants.</p> <p>PHSKC response: The King County Executive and King County Council have recently allocated \$5.9 million in King County funds to support public health preparedness efforts countywide, including in the City of Seattle. The State legislature has recently allocated \$2 million statewide for pandemic flu preparedness activities. The State Department of Health determined the funding formula for this \$2 million in state funds, which is to be used for pandemic flu preparedness. PHSKC received \$400,000 of the \$2 million.</p> <p>PHSKC is continuing to lobby the State Department of Health to allocate state and federal public health preparedness resources based on risk, vulnerability and population factors, thereby channeling a larger, more appropriate share of preparedness funds to Public Health – Seattle & King County. To date, there has been no change in the Washington State Department of Health's position of allocating state and federal public health resources (i.e., the formula is not currently based on risk, vulnerability, and population factors).</p> <p>Public health preparedness funding was cut 12 percent nationwide. Each state's allocation was cut by this same percentage. This translates into a direct reduction of \$450,000 to PHSKC starting in September 2006. PHSKC is expecting to have a deficit going into September 2006, which means we will have to reduce a small number of staff and cut back on everything to do with preparedness.</p> <p>Office of Intergovernmental Relations response: In the 2006 state legislative session the City of Seattle supported SB 6366 concerning preparation and response to pandemic influenza and included \$2 million of new state funds to go along with \$7 million in anticipated federal funding. This bill strengthens the region and states overall ability to respond to large scale emergency problems.</p> <p>For the past couple of years the City of Seattle and a few other local cities have lobbied the State</p>
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	<p>Legislature, Governors Office and federal government for more state and federal funding for emergency preparedness in general and additional homeland security funding in particular. We have advocated for risk-based funding formulas as opposed to the “spreading the peanut butter approach” so often taken. To date our lobbying efforts have not been successful.</p> <p>King County has two lobbyists that represent the King County Council and King County Executive. They are housed within the King County Council. King County also lobbied in support of SB 6366. Any efforts they have made to lobby for more terrorism funding have met with the same results as Seattle’s efforts (unsuccessful).</p>
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<p>TriData Recommendation #93</p> <p>Status: OPEN</p> <p>12/5/05 Executive Response</p>	<p>The City of Seattle should earmark additional funds for bioterrorism and symptom surveillance programs, rather than depending solely on grants. Of course, the City should continue to pursue grants from federal and private sources to supplement the budget.</p> <p>Implementation of this recommendation is a City of Seattle budget decision.</p> <p>The Public Health Department agrees. Public Health preparedness efforts in King County are currently funded 100% through federal grants.</p> <p>Additional Information Collected by the Office of Auditor</p> <p>PHSKC response: Public Health Seattle King County has actively pursued and received preparedness funding from federal sources including the Centers for Disease Control, the National Institutes of Health, the National Association of County and City Health Officials, the King County Office of Emergency Management, the King County Emergency Management Advisory Committee, and the King County Executive and Council. Funding from these sources has enhanced our capabilities, yet has fallen far short of what is needed to prepare Seattle for the public health consequences of terrorist incidents and natural disasters.</p> <p>Much of our daily preparedness work focuses within the city limits of Seattle, as the city harbors a majority of the risk and vulnerability for any hazard affecting this area. Specific public health preparedness capabilities that are critically needed yet unfunded or significantly under-funded include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Disease investigation and surveillance – development of field response teams to coordinate directly with Seattle hospital staff during disease outbreaks <input type="checkbox"/> Establishing and operating mass treatment centers within Seattle (supportive care, vaccination, dispensing antibiotics) <input type="checkbox"/> Environmental Health emergency response to chemical and radiological emergencies within Seattle <input type="checkbox"/> City-wide collaboration and training between Public Health staff and city department responders on public emergencies and response plans <p>Development, training and implementation of risk communications plans that detail the coordination linkages and joint information system that should be established within the City during public health emergencies.</p> <p>Public health emergency preparedness for the Seattle region is a joint endeavor, and will require a</p>
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commitment on the part of the City.

TriData Recommendation #98	<p>Training and equipment should be provided to the medical examiner's office to allow staff to function in a contaminated, mass fatality environment. These individuals should be able to perform their duties without reliance on another agency such as the fire department or police department. While a large part of training and equipment must be coordinated by King County, which funds the medical examiner's office, the City can incorporate medical examiner training into its existing training programs as well.</p>	<p>Status: OPEN</p> <p>The Medical Examiner's Office is still in need of equipment and training to make it functional during a contaminated, mass fatality environment. See last paragraph below for specifics.</p>	<p>12/5/05 Executive Response</p> <p>Public Health has identified homeland security funding through King County government for equipment to support the Medical Examiner's Office in mass fatalities response. More needs to be done through Seattle to support these efforts.</p> <p>Medical Examiner's response: As of March 1, 2006 PHSKC hired a full-time mass fatality planner dedicated to mass fatality and emergency preparedness planning on behalf of Public Health and the Medical Examiner's Office. Since the inception of this position, significant improvements have been made toward the coordination of the Medical Examiner's Office in emergency preparedness planning within the City of Seattle and King County at large. As an example, starting in August 2006 Public Health and the Medical Examiner's office has begun joint mass fatality and emergency planning with the City of Seattle, including the Seattle Police Department, Seattle Fire Department and the Seattle Office of Emergency Management. In addition, through PHSKC the Medical Examiner's Office is represented on the multi-agency emergency preparedness group (MEPG) and has recently had grant funds allocated to purchase some equipment that will assist during a mass fatality event (such as the digital x-ray equipment). The Medical Examiner's office will continue to be represented through Public Health on this committee. Despite these advancements, the Medical Examiner's office is still in need of equipment and training to make it functional during a contaminated, mass fatality environment. Specifically this includes appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE) for the investigators, upgrades to the personal protective equipment for the autopsy personnel, additional biocontainment ready body bags, HAZMAT training for the investigators and financial and logistical support to establish an off-site temporary morgue that could contain operations in a contaminated environment. These operations could not be safely done within the current Medical Examiner's Office facility at Harborview Hospital.</p>
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	<p>There are three key areas of support the Medical Examiner's Office needs from the City of Seattle:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. The Medical Examiner's office needs to be further integrated into Homeland Security planning activities being done by City of Seattle departments.2. The City of Seattle needs to ensure support of key departments, such as Seattle Police, Seattle Fire and Seattle Emergency Management, to plan for and respond to mass fatality events.3. Dedicated, sustainable financial support for Medical Examiner's personnel to be involved in emergency preparedness planning activities.
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<p>TriData Recommendation #109</p>	<p>Establish a mutual aid agreement to utilize courthouses and judges in the case of an emergency in other jurisdictions. The City's Attorney should ensure that there are no legal barriers to convening court in other jurisdictions, and if there are, the Council should revise the rules to allow for it only when the Chief Justice and Mayor determine the courthouse is unusable, and there are no other good locations in Seattle.</p>
<p>Status: OPEN</p>	<p>The mutual aid agreement still needs to be signed by the participating jurisdictions, and the City and the Seattle Municipal Court must decide on the legal approach that will be used to transfer cases during an emergency.</p>
<p>12/5/05 Executive Response</p>	<p>The City is a participating agency in the Regional Disaster Plan for Public and Private Organizations in King County, which establishes mutual aid relationships within the region and will continue to pursue the mechanisms necessary to assure continuity of critical operations.</p>
<p>Additional Information Collected by the Office of City Auditor</p>	<p>Seattle Municipal Court response: Seattle Municipal Court has worked with the King County District and Superior Courts, Renton, Federal Way and Kent Municipal Courts to develop a mutual aid agreement that is ready for signature by the respective jurisdictions. The Court has contacted the Law Department to clarify the legal issues raised by the agreement.</p>

Office of City Auditor Note: There are two approaches that could be taken to address the legality of this recommendation:

1. The first relies upon existing law. Current state law (RCW Title 3) allows Seattle non-felony criminal cases to be filed in King County District Court. While this authority generally has not been exercised, District Court has jurisdiction over City ordinances. All of King County is one district, which has been divided into various divisions (e.g., Seattle, Southwest King County, etc.). Normally, cases are filed in the division in which they occur; however, the District Court Presiding Judge and executive committee may authorize specific cases to be filed in another division for a designated period or until further notice. In case of emergency, state law also allows the venue to be shifted to another district not affected by the emergency. The District Court could appoint Seattle Municipal Court Judges as pro-tem District Court Judges.
2. The second approach would have the City Council pass an ordinance specifying the location of the Seattle Municipal Court, and stating that courtrooms could in an emergency be located elsewhere by, for example, the Mayor and/or the Presiding Seattle Municipal Court Judge. It should be noted that

	<p>there is no specific statutory authorization for such emergency relocation, except insofar as the law relating to district-court venue could be applied by implication. State law (RCW 35.20) establishes the Seattle Municipal Court. That law establishes a municipal court “in” all cities with over 400,000 in population. RCW 35.20 doesn’t contain specific provisions about where courtrooms are to be located, except to state that judicial departments “shall be established in such places as may be provided from time to time by the City’s legislative authority.”</p>
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Appendix VII Current Areas of Emphasis in Emergency Preparedness As Identified by Key Departments

In addition to following up on the specific recommendations contained in the TriData report, we asked officials from key departments to identify areas of emergency preparedness they are currently emphasizing, or in which there is need for more resources. These departments include: the Seattle Police Department, the Seattle Fire Department, Seattle City Light, Seattle Public Utilities, the Seattle Department of Transportation, the Department of Information Technology, and Public Health Seattle/King County. A summary of their comments, by department, is provided below.

We also asked these officials what impact, if any, cuts in federal funding for homeland security would have on the City's preparedness efforts. Nationwide, federal homeland security grant dollars decreased 10.5 percent from \$855 million in 2005 to \$765 million in 2006. The funds received by the City of Seattle in 2006 (\$9.15 million) were 22 percent less than what the City received in 2005 (\$11.8 million).

Seattle Police Department (SPD)

SPD officials told us that their currently emerging priorities include: detection of weapons of mass destruction; monitoring capabilities for chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons and explosives (CBRNE); increasing their capacity for intelligence fusion (the collection, analysis, and diffusion of information); hardening critical infrastructure (which is very difficult and expensive); community, neighborhood, and workplace preparedness; and long-term planning in light of reductions in federal funding. SPD is also concerned about surge capacity in hospitals and how the City would cope with a flu pandemic.

Seattle Fire Department (SFD)

SFD's highest priorities in the emergency preparedness area are training and equipment--such as emergency medical services supplies--for handling mass casualties. SFD officials told us that SFD command-level employees would benefit from training and drills in command and control mass casualty scenarios. It would also be useful for engine companies to have more chemical and radiological detection equipment. Constraints that impede progress in these areas include a lack of available funding and the difficulties in finding time for staff to attend training and then practice what they've learned.

Any cuts in federal funding will affect SFD because it has used federal grant funds to purchase needed emergency preparedness equipment.

Seattle City Light (SCL)

SCL's emergency preparedness priorities are continuity of operations and pandemic planning. These areas would benefit from more resources because they are labor intensive.

SCL's Security and Emergency Preparedness Director stated that because SCL hasn't relied on or received a lot of federal funding for its emergency preparedness efforts, federal funding cuts won't have much affect on SCL. SCL received some federal grant dollars for conducting vulnerability studies, planning and training.

Seattle Public Utilities (SPU)

Seattle Public Utilities most pressing emergency preparedness issues at this time include:

- National Incident Management System (NIMS) and Incident Management System (ICS) training
- Developing Emergency Management plans, exercises and training (including SPU's Continuity of Operations Plan)
- Ensuring that it can perform critical infrastructure assessments immediately following a disaster
- Funding and other resources to re-establish the Department Operations Center (DOC) at SPU's Operations Control Center (OCC)

Time and competing priorities are the only challenges SPU is encountering with relation to its current pressing issues. Nothing else is keeping them from meeting their goals.

While SPU welcomes and make all attempts to secure as much federal funding as they can, SPU's Security and Emergency Management Program does not rely on federal funding for any of its work plan priorities.

Seattle Department of Transportation (SDOT)

SDOT's most pressing issues for emergency preparedness are a new, fully equipped and functioning Emergency Operations Center and completion of training in the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and Incident Command System (ICS).

Another priority is completing a "Continuity of Operations Plan" (COG) to address SDOT's ability to provide essential services under extreme conditions (such as reduced work force due to pandemic flu). SDOT expects that their COG plan will be in place before the end of 2006.

Other priorities, such as hardening critical transportation infrastructure, require substantial expenditures. City revenues are not designed to address the extreme capital demands created by having to mitigate against terrorist attacks. To the extent that funds are not available from "external" sources, such as the federal government, SDOT will not be in a position to make rapid and substantive improvements in the security of critical elements of the transportation system.

Department of Information Technology (DOIT)

DOIT's emergency preparedness priorities are preparing the ESF-2 Functional plan (Annex to the City's Disaster Preparedness Plan) and the DoIT Departmental Emergency Response plan;

then DOIT wants to train its employees about the plans, and test their knowledge with drills and exercises. Constraints to achieving these goals are limited staff resources and budget constraints.

The City has significantly upgraded its emergency preparedness relative to technology over the last few years using UASI grants, State Homeland Security grants, and similar funds. Seattle has acquired a considerable amount of technology and equipment, but it still needs to fund ongoing operations and maintenance of these new capabilities, and replacement of these capabilities as equipment becomes outmoded.

Public Health Seattle/King County (Public Health)

In the public health arena, there are ten core capabilities needed to achieve emergency preparedness. These capabilities, as outlined in Public Health's In-House Preparedness Strategy, are:

1. Detect, report, investigate and control emergent communicable disease outbreaks;
2. Detect, report, and mitigate exposure to environmental hazards;
3. Dispense medications/vaccinations quickly and on a mass scale;
4. Quarantine/isolate individuals; monitor their health status daily;
5. Triage, transport and track mass casualties;
6. Collect, secure, store, identify, autopsy and certify mass casualties;
7. Analyze hazardous substances and biological agents proficiently and quickly;
8. Stabilize and treat mass casualty incident victims for infectious disease, hazardous exposure, burns, trauma or radiological poisoning;
9. Disseminate information about health risks and protective behaviors to the public and key partners; and
10. Lead the regional response to health-related emergencies utilizing the National Incident Management System (NIMS).

Public Health's Preparedness Strategy outlines the list of processes and systems needed to achieve these ten core capabilities, and guides Public Health's use of funds.

Public Health officials stated that their most pressing problem is the erosion of core public health funding:

"It is one thing to have an emergency plan in place, but another to have the people to implement it. In the public health arena, the people who will respond are nurses, doctors, and pharmacists. To be prepared to respond to an emergency, adequate staffing must already be in place. Our current funding mechanisms make it challenging to retain staff. For example, the State of Washington provides us with local capital development funds but these funds "don't inflate," which in essence means that we receive a funding cut in real dollars each year. Our personnel costs, however, are tied to local COLA increases (4.66 percent last year), so they increase every year. This really puts a squeeze on our budget. Funding is also needed to build and maintain core public health infrastructure."

Another public health challenge in emergency preparedness is reaching vulnerable populations (i.e., the homeless, non-English speakers, the deaf/blind population, and/or any person or group who might be isolated or alone). This requires connecting with the diverse array of community-based organizations that serve these populations, as well as an ongoing commitment by local and regional governments to build long term capacity in community-based organizations. Public Health is working with long term care facilities and mental health agencies to plan how to meet the needs of the populations they serve in an emergency. Public Health officials noted that enhancing their capability to serve vulnerable populations in an emergency appears to be in alignment with the City of Seattle's values and goals, and that the City may want to consider funding part of these efforts.

Appendix VIII Additional criteria are available to the City for assessing the effectiveness of its emergency preparedness efforts

In addition to responding to the TriData report's recommendations and their own in-house expertise, City officials told us that there are two criteria they use to guide their emergency preparedness planning and decision-making. First, to receive federal funding, the City must comply with numerous federal requirements, many of which were put into place under Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPDs). HSPDs 5 and 8 significantly affect federal funding to the City of Seattle. Second, the City's Director of Emergency Management told us that one of Seattle's long term goals is to seek accreditation through the Emergency Management Accreditation Program. See below for more information on these criteria.

Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5: Management of Domestic Incidents

HSPD-5, issued on February 28, 2003, enhances the ability of the United States to manage domestic incidents by establishing a single, comprehensive national incident management system. HSPD-5 directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop and administer the National Incident Management System (NIMS). It requires all federal departments and agencies to adopt NIMS, and, beginning in FY 2005, makes NIMS adoption by state and local organizations a condition for federal preparedness assistance.

The City's Director of Emergency Preparedness told us that NIMS compliance requirements have evolved and will likely continue to do so. Examples of areas where the City of Seattle has already complied with NIMS requirements include developing a local NIMS implementation plan and providing required NIMS training to its employees. In 2007, NIMS will require state and local organizations to classify their emergency resources by category and capability. The City of Seattle's Fleets and Facilities Department requested one additional FTE in the 2007-2008 budget for a Strategic Advisor I. This position would be responsible for standardizing how the City categorizes ("types") its resources and performing a rolling stock inventory, so that the City can fulfill the Homeland Security Department's reporting requirements.

Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8: National Preparedness

HSPD-8, issued on December 17, 2003, identifies steps for improved incident response coordination. This directive describes how Federal departments and agencies will prepare for such a response, including prevention activities during the early stages of a terrorism incident. The directive is a companion to HSPD-5.

Overview of National Accreditation Standards for Emergency Management

The Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP) is a voluntary accreditation process for state, territorial, tribal, county and municipal government programs that coordinate and/or provide activities related to disaster prevention, mitigation preparedness, response, and recovery. EMAP, an independent, public nonprofit organization fosters excellence and accountability in emergency management and homeland security programs by establishing credible standards verified through a peer review accreditation process. Accreditation includes a

self-assessment phase as well as an on-site assessment by an independent review, or “assessor” team.

Accreditation is attained by demonstrating that the government program meets EMAP Standard criteria, which describe the elements an emergency management program should have to be prepared to deal with the jurisdiction’s hazards and threats. The EMAP Standard consists of 58 standards to evaluate programs that apply for EMAP accreditation. The EMAP Standard’s foundation is the 2004 National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 1600 Standard for Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity Programs, which includes language that explains the standards’ meaning for public sector accreditation. The EMAP standard covers:

- Program Management
- Program Elements Generally
- Laws and Authorities
- Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment
- Hazard Mitigation
- Resource Management
- Mutual Aid
- Planning
- Direction, Control and Coordination
- Communications and Warning
- Operations and Procedures
- Logistics and Facilities
- Training
- Exercises, Evaluations and Corrective Action
- Crisis Communications, Public Education and Information
- Finance and Administration

Accreditation requires documented compliance with all 58 EMAP standards in these 16 areas. For more information about the EMAP accreditation program, see www.emaponline.org.

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